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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) have long been recognized as
a form of “investment” entitled to protection under bilateral
investment treaties (“BITs”) and other international investment
agreements (“IIAs”).1 The term “investment” has been defined
broadly in BITs to include almost every kind of “asset.”2 Many BITs
provide a detailed listing of the types of intellectual property that
may be considered as a form of investment asset, for example,
“copyrights, patents, utility-model patents, industrial designs, trademarks, trade-names, trade and business secrets, technical processes,
known-how, and goodwill.”3 The inclusion of IPRs in the definition
1. In this article, I use the acronym “IIA” to refer, interchangeably, to BITs
and other bilateral, regional, or plurilateral trade agreements that contain
investment chapters or other provisions to facilitate and protect foreign investment.
2. See, e.g., German Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment issued by the Federal Ministry of Economics and
Labour,
art.
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.fesglobalization.org/dog_publications/Appendix1GermanModelTreaty.pdf
(characterizing “investment" as an all-encompassing concept, including almost any
kind of business activity and extending to assets in all sectors of the economy).
3. Id. To qualify as an investment, intellectual property, like any other type of
asset, “must have the characteristics of an investment, such as the commitment of
capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of
risk.” MAHNAZ MALIK, 2ND ANNUAL FORUM OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY
INVESTMENT NEGOTIATORS, MARRAKECH, MOROCCO, 3-4 NOVEMBER 2008: INT’L
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DEFINITION OF
INVESTMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 6 available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/dci_recent_dev.pdf (citing Norway’s Draft Model
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 2(2) (2007)); The
Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft Consolidated Text, Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, at Def., ¶2, n.2 (1998); see also
U.S.
Model
BIT,
art.
1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf
(defining
intellectual property rights as one of the forms of assets constituting an
investment). For example, the mere possession of a registered patent, without its
exploitation as an investment subject to risk and with the expectation of gain or
loss, may limit its consideration as an investment. Moreover, because IP rights are
granted territorially, subject matter that is not protected in a given country
normally belongs to the public domain. See Carlos M. Correa, Investment
Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for the Granting
of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331, 340 (2004) [hereinafter Correa,
Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements]. Such intellectual
property may not be considered an asset owned or controlled by an investor, unless
the relevant IIA provides otherwise. As a more limiting approach, some BITs
provide that intellectual property rights are encompassed in their investment
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of “investment” reflects that intellectual property, even as an
intangible asset, can be a valuable part of a foreign direct investment
(“FDI”).4 Indeed, the first BIT, signed in 1959 between Germany and
Pakistan, recognized that intellectual property may be a core element
of a foreign investment between these two countries.5 The BIT
defined investment to “comprise capital brought into the territory of
the other Party for investment in various forms in the shape of assets
such as foreign exchange, goods, property rights, patents and
technical knowledge.”6
With this early coverage of intellectual property in BITs, it is
perhaps surprising that there has yet to be a publicly reported
decision concerning an IPR-centered investment dispute.7 This could
definitions only if it is recognized as protected under the national law of both
contracting States. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
[UNCTAD], 2007, Intellectual Property Provisions in International Investment
Agreements, IIA Monitor No. 1, UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/1, at 3 (2007)
[hereinafter UNCTAD IP Provisions].
4. UNCTAD IP Provisions, supra note 3, at 2. It can be quite difficult,
however, to measure the magnitude of the intellectual property component in
foreign direct investment. Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade and
Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 524 (2005).
5. See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak.,
Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 6575, arts. 8, 10 [hereinafter Germany-Pakistan BIT]
(considering “patents and technical knowledge” as investments and aspiring to
promote the exchange of “scientific and technical knowledge”); Jeswald W.
Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their
Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L L. 655, 655-59
(1990), reprinted in R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES:
CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 31 (2005) (explaining that BIT negotiation
in the thirty years following the 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT has been a lively area
of public international law, with over 300 BITs signed).
6. Germany-Pakistan BIT, supra note 5, art. 8(1)(a) (emphasis added). This
BIT reveals an interesting focus on technology transfer issues. Article 10 provides
that: “Each Party shall co-operate with the other in furthering the interchange and
use of scientific and technical knowledge and development of training facilities
particularly in the interest of increasing productivity and improving standards of
living in their territories.” Id. art. 10.
7. See, e.g., Tsai-Yu Lin, Compulsory Licenses for Access to Medicines,
Expropriation and Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment
Agreements – Are There Issues Beyond the TRIPS Agreement?, 40 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 152, 171 (2009). (“Thus far, no claim regarding
compulsory licenses has been brought before investor-state arbitration and led to
an arbitral award.”). It is important to note that while investor-state arbitral awards
rendered under the rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) are normally published (or at least excerpts of the
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soon change, however, given the trajectory of the modern economy,
in which foreign investments reflect an increasing concentration of
intellectual capital invested in knowledge goods protected by IPRs. It
is impossible to ignore the increasing significance of intellectual
property in a globalized world in which science and technology, as
well as creative works and international branding, are generating
enormous value.8 Thus, it has been observed that “[i]ntellectual
property rights . . . have never been more economically and
politically important or controversial than they are today.”9 This
legal reasoning of the award), awards resulting from investor-state arbitrations
under other rules such as the Arbitration Rules of the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) usually are not. Thus, it is possible that
an investor-state case involving intellectual property has already occurred. In a
recent case, two companies of the Shell Group, in response to an alleged
expropriation of Shell’s logo and brand name, filed a claim against Nicaragua
alleging breach of a BIT between the Netherlands and Nicaragua. However, the
case was discontinued due to a settlement between the parties. Following a
settlement whose terms were not released to the public, the case was discontinued
pursuant to an order of ICSID’s Secretary General in March 2007. See Shell
Brands Int’l AG v. Republic of Nicaragua, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/14 (Mar. 12,
2007). The case had a complex background because the alleged expropriation of
Shell’s trademarks by the Nicaraguan government was in response to Shell’s nonpayment a judgment entered against Shell in the Nicaraguan courts. The
Nicaraguan government measures against Shell's trademarks triggered an alleged
violation of one of the terms of the BIT between Nicaragua and The Netherlands.
The BIT defines an “investment” to include “rights in the field of intellectual
property, technical processes, goodwill and know-how.” See Agreement on
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Nicar.-Neth., June 16,
2003, art. 1, 2205 U.N.T.S. I-39151.
8. See Francis Gurry, The Evolution of Technology and Markets and the
Management of Intellectual Property Rights, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 369, 371
(1996) (“The new significance of intellectual capital and the increased demand for
intellectual property are both occurring within the context of the globalization of
markets.”); see also Alejandro Garcia & Sophie Lamb, Arbitration of Intellectual
Property Disputes, in Global Arb. Rev., EUR. & MIDDLE E. ARB. REV. 2008,
available
at
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/3/sections
/5/chapters/66/arbitration-intellectual-property-disputes (“In a global economy
increasingly based upon conceptual products, converged technologies and
international networks, intellectual property rights (IPRs) continue to be the most
valuable assets of many businesses.”).
9. Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and
Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S. Federal Law, at v (UNCTAD-Int’l
Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev. [ICTSD], Issue Paper No. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20064_en.pdf. In a recent article, I
demonstrated the high stakes involved in relation to intellectual property, trade,
and setting technology standards, which can involve national policy and the
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tandem of economic and political importance, combined with
persistent international tensions concerning the proper scope, length
of protection, and enforcement of intellectual property and IPRs,
forms a potent cocktail in which disputes concerning intellectual
property can arise between foreign investors and host states.
This article focuses on one area in which government action could
create a direct impact on FDI involving intellectual property: the
authorization of a compulsory license. Through the compulsory
license, a government authority interferes directly with a privately
owned IPR, such as a patent, to authorize its use by the government
or by one or more third parties, subject to certain terms.10 The
compulsory license issue often triggers World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) trade law considerations. In fact, most of the commentary
concerning compulsory licenses has focused on international trade
law and public health issues,11 in particular, the Agreement on Tradeintervention of U.S. government officials at the highest level. See Christopher
Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Balancing Concerns
of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403, 1436-39 (2007) (noting that officials at levels as high
as the Secretary of State and the Vice President expressed concerns and objections
in the wake of China’s attempt to set technology standards that would require nonChinese wireless equipment vendors to obtain certain IP rights from a small group
of Chinese companies).
10. See infra Part I (discussing compulsory licenses in greater detail).
11. See, e.g., Sandra Bartelt, Compulsory Licenses Pursuant to TRIPS Article
31 in the Light of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 6 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 283, 306 (2003) (concluding that the Doha
TRIPS Declaration developed in reaction to the competing ideals of the
widespread availability of affordable medicines and the spurring of technological
innovation through the protection of patents); Rosa Castro Bernieri, Intellectual
Property Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and Access to Medicines: The
Case of Latin America, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 548, 567 (2006) (noting that
strict BIT regulations jeopardize the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement, thus
inhibiting efforts to address public health issues); Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting
Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REV. 131, 192 (2007)
(advocating a system that provides least developed and developing countries with
access to medicine by compensating producers based on each country’s relative
level of development, thereby easing the financial burden on private actors while
simultaneously confronting public health concerns); Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs
at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals
Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 891-92 (2003) (concluding that,
based on case studies of six drug manufacturers, compulsory licenses do not result
in declining innovation); Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property:
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS
Agreement”),12 which sets conditions for the issuance of compulsory
licenses in Article 31,13 and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, adopted by the WTO in 2001, which
clarifies and confirms that Member States have the right to grant
compulsory licenses to protect public health.14 At the same time,
while significant attention has been given to investment treaty
arbitration in recent years, much less has been written about
intellectual property issues arising under BITs, and even less so in
relation to intellectual property (including compulsory licenses) in
the context of investor-state arbitration. Thus, despite the standard
inclusion of intellectual property in the definition of “investment” in
IIAs, there has been surprisingly little scholarship examining this
specialized form of investment in relation to the standards of

79, 91-94 (2004) (criticizing the Central American Free Trade Agreement’s
provisions preventing generic drug companies from producing affordable medicine
during the period of “data exclusivity” or the patent life without the authorization
of the patent holder as contrary to the purpose of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health).
12. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments: Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS Agreement is
one of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) covered agreements, containing
rules on patents, copyrighted works and trademarks, and other intellectual
property. Id. Through the TRIPS Agreement, all WTO member states have
committed to maintain a certain level of protection for IPRs. “The TRIPS
Agreement is arguably the strongest normative vector in setting IP policy.”
Gervais, supra note 4, at 524. Gervais observed that the TRIPS Agreement
provides comfort for companies deciding where and when to expand into new
markets because it contains a complete set of IP norms adjusted to the “highest
common denominator among major industrialized countries as of 1991.” See id. at
506-09.
13. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text (discussing of the conditions
for issuance of a compulsory license under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement).
14. See World Trade Organization [WTO], Ministerial Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration]; see also WTO,
Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (2003). The
2003 Decision created a special compulsory license mechanism which “enhance[d]
access to patented pharmaceuticals by countries with limited manufacturing
capacity.” Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ for
Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 935 (2008).
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protection that would be relied upon to form claims in an investorstate dispute. The question I consider is whether a compulsory
license may constitute an indirect expropriation.
The scope of intellectual property claims grounded in rights
created by IIAs is uncertain, and the compulsory license is but a
specific example of this uncertainty.15 If an investment dispute arises
concerning a host state’s issuance of a compulsory license covering
an investor’s intellectual property (e.g., a patent), the following basic
questions arise:
(i)

How will the expropriation standard in IIAs be
applied to the dispute?

(ii)

Are there potential complications arising from
overlapping and possibly competing international
legal frameworks, in particular, obligations arising
under an IIA, and their possible intersection with
multilateral disciplines under the TRIPS Agreement?

At the intersection between IIAs and the TRIPS Agreement, the
following three additional questions may arise with respect to
investments:
(iii)

Can a government’s authorization of a compulsory
license be TRIPS Agreement compliant, yet violate
the expropriation provision in a relevant IIA?

(iv)

Can a government’s violation of the TRIPS
Agreement provide a basis for an independent
expropriation claim under the IIA in investor-state
arbitration?

(v)

Alternatively, can TRIPS Agreement norms provide
interpretive background on minimum standards of
protection under international law to inform IIA
standards such as indirect expropriation?

In Part I, I provide background on the contours of compulsory
licenses, discussing their underlying rationale and long, yet
contentious, past. In Part II, I discuss the application of expropriation
15. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements,
supra note 3, at 352.

GIBSON_SECOND_AUTHOR_CHECK (DO NOT DELETE)

364

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/14/2010 9:24 AM

[25:357

standards under IIAs and international law to the compulsory
licensing circumstances, looking at international practice and the
recent United States BIT with Uruguay. I also address the particular
situation in which the BIT itself may exclude any claims arising as a
result of a compulsory license that is considered to be in compliance
with the TRIPS Agreement’s Article 31. In Part III, I turn to the
complexity of overlapping treaty rights, evaluating a potential “fork
in the road” as an investor considers whether to pursue claims
through investment arbitration or the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, as well as whether WTO law and standards might be
applied in the investment dispute context.
This article addressing compulsory licenses and issues of indirect
expropriation is intended as an introductory treatment of the more
general subject of intellectual property and international investment
disputes. There are other IIA standards, such as “fair and equitable”
treatment, that may also be applicable to compulsory licenses.
Further, there are other forms of government action or inaction,
besides issuance of a compulsory license, which may harm an
investor’s IP-based investment.

I. BACKGROUND—COMPULSORY LICENSES
Compulsory licenses are controversial instruments that bear an
inherently contentious character. They have long been recognized in
intellectual property law, although seldom used. The term
“compulsory license” refers to circumstances in which a government
intervenes to compel the owner of an IPR, normally a patent, to grant
use of that right to the state or to other third parties.16 The
government authorization, whether by an executive, administrative,
or judicial authority, is given without the consent of the intellectual
property owner and normally on an ex post basis in response to a
developing need or to concerns of anti-competitive use of patent
rights.17 The compulsory license may be issued by the government
16. See id. at 346 (adding that certain limitations are placed on the use of such
right); Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on
Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J.
283, 283 n.1 (2008) (describing compulsory licenses as a “compelled relaxation”
of the right to exclude).
17. See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 16, at 283 n.1 (elaborating that compulsory
licensing in the context of an “emergent need” has a significant ability to affect
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authority with conditions, such as delimiting the use for which the
license is authorized, specifying which third parties are entitled to
use the patent, time restrictions on that use, and payment of
compensation, if any, to the intellectual property owner.18 Because
the compulsory license targets “use,” it does not, strictly speaking,
deprive the owner of ownership rights over the protected intellectual
property.19
To understand the stakes involved with the issuance of
compulsory licenses and their impact on foreign direct investment
and potential investment disputes, it is useful to review a few basic
principles underlying intellectual property.20 IPRs exist largely in
foreign direct investment (“FDI”)).
18. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements,
supra note 3, at 346. The categories of the actual intellectual property to which
government authorizations may apply ranges from extremely narrow to quite
broad:
Government use authorizations may be in the form of a compulsory license
under a patent, but may be expressed simply as an authorization to use a
technology in line with government requirements, subject only to the
possibility of an infringement action with remedies limited to damages in the
form of a reasonable royalty.
Taubman, supra note 14, at 947.
19. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements,
supra note 3, at 346.
20. There is no universally accepted definition of the term “intellectual
property” which holds true for all jurisdictions. However, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”) states broadly that “[i]ntellectual property (IP)
refers to creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic works, and symbols,
names, images, and designs used in commerce.” WIPO, What is Intellectual
Property?, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
The WIPO Convention defines the broad spectrum of subject matter relating to IP
rights, including:
– literary, artistic and scientific works,
– performances of performing artists, phonograms, and broadcasts,
– inventions in all fields of human endeavor,
– scientific discoveries,
– industrial designs,
– trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and designations,
– protection against unfair competition,
and all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial,
scientific, literary or artistic fields.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 2(viii),
July 14, 1967, amended Sept. 28, 1979, WO029EN, available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/convention/pdf/trtdocs_wo029.p
df.
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order to generate and encourage investment, while preventing third
parties from capitalizing on the use of the underlying subject matter
of those IPRs.21 The legal right to exclude third parties from use of a
particular intellectual creation is fundamental to the ownership of
intellectual property.22 In this sense, “the rights granted are
essentially negative: they are rights to stop others [from] doing
certain things.”23 This legal right is territorial in nature and arises
through the state’s statutorily-created grant of intellectual property to
private parties, which in many cases involves registration of the right
(e.g., for patents or trademarks).24 The right to exclude enables the
creator to gain revenues or other reward through use of the
intellectual property. Granting legal protection for a new innovation
of science or a creative work not only provides incentive for creation,
but enables the owner to produce, market, and sell or license it. The
broader public purpose behind granting such exclusionary rights is to
benefit the public through the increase in knowledge, as well as to
generate new technology and cultural goods, while, in the case of
trademarks, providing a measure of consumer protection.25

21. Bird & Cahoy, supra note 16, at 285.
22. See, e.g., William Grantham, The Arbitrability of International Intellectual
Property Disputes, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 173, 180 (1996) (“A patent or a
trademark, for instance, is generally a statutorily-created state grant of a limited
monopoly or exclusive right of exploitation.”). Intellectual property is a
specialized form of private property. Underlying the rights of all private
property—whether intellectual property or real property—is the right to choose
whether to keep or sell it, or to determine who may use it and on what terms. One
key difference between intellectual property and physical property is that more
than one person can “use [intellectual property] at the same time without
significantly diminishing the value of each use. For that reason, the cost of
granting exclusive rights to its use can be greater than in the case of physical
property, where selecting among uses is a virtual necessity.” Ronald A. Cass,
Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Exception that Ate the Rule?
4-5 (Washington Legal Found., Working Paper series no. 150, 2007), available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/casswpCover.pdf.
23. WILLIAM R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,
TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 6 (Sweet & Maxwell 4th ed. 1999).
24. See Grantham, supra note 22, at 182 (noting that some courts perceive IP
rights as public grants, and, as such, private arbitration on the validity of IP rights
cannot circumvent the court’s jurisdiction).
25. See, e.g., Ingo Selting, FDI and International Protection of Intellectual
Property, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 205, 206-07
(Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999) (acknowledging the unfortunate
reality that developing countries’ recognition and protection of IPRs will likely
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In the context of foreign investment and international trade,
particularly in a modern market economy, IPRs provide the owner
with the legal protection necessary to support entry into a foreign
market for investment (or trade) and to maintain a competitive
position in that market.26 The exclusivity afforded by the IPR enables
the owner to exercise leverage in the marketplace. This is
particularly true for firms that depend on innovation to compete,
while producing knowledge-rich goods and services.27
Exclusive rights are therefore central to the intellectual property
system, and yet this is precisely where the compulsory license
operates. It enables the government concerned—which may have
(through its intellectual property office) registered the IPR for the
owner in the first place—to override that exclusivity by authorizing
use of the privately owned IPR for itself or for one or more third
parties, while dictating any relevant terms or conditions to the
license. For this reason, compulsory licenses are criticized by some
who view them as a threat not only to private property and security,
but also to innovation and growth.28 Similar to a government
interference with real property—through use of eminent domain
power (or mandatory easements or servitudes)—a compulsory
license can substantially reduce the security in private property.29
From an investment perspective, one concern is that frequent or
“overbroad compulsory licensing of patents can seriously undermine
the incentive to invest.”30

lead to higher priced goods and services in those countries).
26. See Taubman, supra note 14, at 937 & n.57 (advocating a solid IP legal
framework in order to encourage innovation, competition, and entries into new
markets).
27. Id.
28. Cass, supra note 22, at 1-2.
29. See id. at 2 (speculating that the decision in Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005), an eminent domain case, infused the government with too
much power in its ability to impose on private property, and portending a similar
fate for intellectual property rights by way of compulsory licenses).
30. Greg S. Slater, Compulsory Licensing Trends in the Technology Sector:
China as a Case Study on Licensing Patents, in ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: COMPULSORY LICENSING AND OTHER IP CONTROLS 135, 135
(2009),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/midyear2009/compulsoryLOIPC.pdf; see also
SWEDISH NAT’L BD. OF TRADE, THE WTO DECISION ON COMPULSORY LICENSING:
DOES IT ENABLE IMPORT OF MEDICINES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH GRAVE
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Despite these persistent concerns, some form of compulsory
licensing has been recognized internationally for more than 125
years. The Paris Convention, dating from 1883,31 first recognized
compulsory licensing as a means to address the abusive exercise of
patent rights on “failure to work” grounds, thereby justifying
issuance in limited cases.32 Compulsory licensing, however, has
remained “a controversial, abrasive issue in international trade
relations” for more than a century, right up to and through
negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration.33

PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEMS? 7 (Kommerskollegium 2008), available at
http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/Arbetsomr%C3%A5den/WTO/Hande
l%20och%20skydd%20f%C3%B6r%20immateriella%20r%C3%A4ttigheter%20%20TRIPS/Rapport%20The_WTO_decision_on_compulsory_licensing.pdf
(“There is . . . a risk that compulsory licenses reduce innovation and investment by
diminishing the value of a patent.”).
31. Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5, March 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 11851 (last revised July 14, 1967).
32. The Paris Convention authorizes compulsory licensing only on grounds of
“failure to work” or “insufficient working,” thereby distinguishing or impliedly
limiting other possible grounds, which are not addressed. Article 5A, paragraphs
(2), (3) and (4) provide in relevant part:
(2) Each country . . . shall have the right to take legislative measures
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which
might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent,
for example, failure to work.
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the
grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the
said abuses. No proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may
be instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant of the first
compulsory license.
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to
work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years
from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of
the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused if the
patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory
license shall be non–exclusive and shall not be transferable, even in the form
of the grant of a sub–license, except with that part of the enterprise or
goodwill which exploits such license.
Id. art. 5.
33. Taubman, supra note 14, at 929-30; see also CORNISH, supra note 23, at
291 (“The meetings of Paris Convention countries have long been the field for
exhausting battles over the principle of compulsory licensing. . . . [which] led to
the 1982 breakdown in revising the Paris Convention.”). Antony Taubman
provides a fine overview of the background, history of negotiations, and
controversy concerning compulsory licenses. Taubman, supra note 14, at 929-33.
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Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, one of its most detailed
provisions containing “a splay of conditions,”34 does not actually use
the phrase “compulsory license,” but instead refers to use “without
authorization of the right holder.”35 The article nonetheless permits
the grant of a compulsory license by WTO Member States, so long
as certain procedures are followed and terms fulfilled, the most
important of which include: (i) each compulsory license “shall be
considered on its individual merits;”36 (ii) the compulsory license can
be authorized only after efforts have been made—and have failed—
to secure the right holder’s authorization “on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions;”37 (iii) the compulsory license must be nonexclusive and non-assignable, with a “scope and duration . . . limited
to the purpose for which it was authorized,” and it must cease if and
when the conditions change to eliminate that purpose;38 (iv) the
license must be used “predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market” of the authorizing State;39 and (v) the right holder must be
“paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case,
taking into account the economic value of the authorization.”40
Article 31 leaves open the substantive grounds on which a WTO
Member State may rely to justify a compulsory license, and no
longer refers, for instance, to patent abuse on grounds of failure to
work.41 However, Article 31 does make reference to several potential
He observes more generally that, “as a measure of the contentiousness of IP as a
trade issue, within the entire WTO package of agreements only TRIPS cites the
importance of ‘reducing tensions.’” Id. at 928 (citing TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 12, pmbl.).
34. CORNISH, supra note 23, at 291. Cornish adds that the “hostility of the
United States to the very idea of compulsory patent licensing finds determined
expression in these provisions.” Id.
35. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31 (including unauthorized use by
the government or government-approved third parties). It was left to the Doha
Declaration to use the words “compulsory license” and to confirm that “[e]ach
Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine
the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.” Ministerial Declaration, supra
note 14, ¶ 5(b).
36. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31(a).
37. Id. art. 31(b). This obligation can be waived in the face of a national
emergency or “other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id.
38. Id. arts. 31(c)-(e), (g).
39. Id. art. 31(f).
40. Id. art. 31(h).
41. Although there had been some debate about whether the grounds in Article
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reasons for authorizing a compulsory license. First, there is
recognition in Article 31(b) that a national emergency or
circumstances of extreme urgency could justify authorization of a
compulsory license. Second, Article 31(b) refers to cases of public
(governmental) non-commercial use. Third, Article 31(k) recognizes
that a compulsory license may be issued to remedy anti-competitive
practices. Finally, Article 31(l) recognizes that a compulsory license
may be needed to permit the exploitation of an important “second”
patent (i.e., “dependency patent”), which cannot be utilized without
infringing on the patent that is the subject of the compulsory
license.42 More broadly, the negotiating history of the TRIPS
Agreement reveals that two basic rationales for government
intervention stand behind these examples.43 On the one hand, a
compulsory license may be authorized pursuant to a state’s police
power, such as in emergency circumstances dictated by national
security or public health concerns.44 On the other hand, the license
may be authorized to correct anti-competitive behavior so that a
particular patent does not “undesirably constrain competition
between firms.”45 This form of compulsory license is geared toward
managing the marketplace and sustaining competitive relations.46
Both of these rationales reflect a public purpose, although the public
benefits less directly in the latter case.47 Issuing a compulsory license
under either rationale may involve contentious and fact-specific
determinations, putting the IPR owner at odds with the government
authorizing the compulsory license.

31 were exclusive, the Doha Declaration confirmed that Member States have the
“freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”
Ministerial Declaration, supra note 14, ¶ 5(b). It must be borne in mind that
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement already indicates that national law may
provide “limited exceptions” to exclusive patent rights, “provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.” TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 12, art. 30.
42. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31(l).
43. See Taubman, supra note 14, at 947 n.91 (attributing the enunciation of
these rationales to the Swiss Delegation to the TRIPS negotiations).
44. Id. at 947.
45. Id. at 947-48.
46. Id. at 947-48.
47. Id.
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Some form of statutory compulsory licensing is common in the
national systems of many countries, even if it is not often put to
use.48 It may have different legal bases and be authorized subject to
different administrative or judicial procedures.49 In practice,
compulsory licensing provisions have been “commonly enmeshed in
such a net of procedures that it is only the threat of invoking them
that carries any significant weight.”50 Additionally, uncertainty exists
in some cases about whether national statutes comply with Article 31

48. See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 16, at 292 (indicating that at least one
hundred countries make some form of compulsory license available). In the
United States, compulsory licenses have been ordered by the Federal Trade
Commission only in limited circumstances in relation to antitrust concerns, such as
(i) making the compulsory license of certain intellectual property a condition for
approval of a merger between two market-dominant competitors, or (ii) ordering a
compulsory license of certain intellectual property to remedy violations of federal
law prohibiting unfair acts and practices and unfair methods of competition. See,
e.g., Dow Chemical Co., 66 FED. Reg. 9851, 9851 (Federal Trade Comm’n Feb.
12, 2001) (proposed consent agreement) (requiring Dow, as a condition of its
merger with Union Carbide, to license various patents and other intellectual
property relating to the market for polyethylenes to BP Amoco and Exxon); In the
Matter of Rambus, Inc., No. 9302 (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2007) (Opinion of the
Commission
on
Remedy),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205opinion.pdf (reasoning that Rambus'
false statements to a standard-setting organization about its patent portfolio
enabled it to monopolize the markets for four technologies incorporated into
standards set by the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council, and ordering
Rambus to license its SDRAM and DDR SDRAM technologies at royalty rates not
to exceed a maximum set by the FTC); Dell Computer Corporation; Prohibited
Trade Practices, and Affirmative Corrective Actions, 62 Fed. Reg. 4767, 4767
(F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1997) (consent order) (prohibiting Dell from enforcing its patent
rights against any PC manufacturer using the VL-bus technology due to Dell’s
"unfair or deceptive acts"). The American Intellectual Property Law Association,
in comments during the FTC proceedings concerning Dell, stated that:
The appearance of a United States government agency imposing a
compulsory patent license, especially a royalty-free compulsory license, must
be avoided except in response to egregious conduct. Other countries could
cite such an action as the basis for imposing broad and onerous compulsory
licensing requirements upon United States patentees abroad.
Federal
Trade
Commission,
Protecting
America’s
Consumers,
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/aipla.shtm (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
49. See Taubman, supra note 14, at 931-32 (using the term “non-voluntary use
authorizations” to administrative or judicial grants of use for either public interest
or competition purposes).
50. CORNISH, supra note 23, at 291.
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of the TRIPS Agreement.51 To date, governmental authorities have
granted relatively few high-profile compulsory licenses for reasons
other than antitrust-competition law concerns.52
Perhaps one of the most well-known recent instances involves a
compulsory license issued by Brazil. In May 2007, Brazilian
President Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva signed a decree establishing a
compulsory license to allow Brazil to manufacture or import a
generic form of the patented anti-HIV drug Efavirenz after rejecting
an offer by Merck & Co. to discount the drug’s price by thirty
percent.53 This occurred shortly after Thailand decided to take similar
steps in relation to Efavirenz and certain other anti-HIV drugs.54
These moves have been viewed as controversial, with the United
States government signaling its concerns.55 Rather than respond by
arguing a failure to comply with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement,
Merck issued a statement focusing on foreign investment and
characterizing the Brazilian government’s move as an expropriation.
Merck stated that “[t]his expropriation of intellectual property sends
a chilling signal to research-based companies about the attractiveness
of undertaking risky research on diseases that affect the developing

51. See, e.g., Ching-fu Lin, Note, Filling in the Gaps of the TRIPS Agreement:
Reflections on the Taiwan-Philips CD-R Compulsory License Case, 3 ASIAN J.
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 557 (2008) (reviewing the issuance of a
compulsory license under Article 76 of Taiwan’s Patent Act and arguing that both
Article 76 and the issuance of the license were valid and consistent with the TRIPS
Agreement). The article observes that there has yet to be a WTO dispute settlement
report that directly interprets Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Id. at 565.
52. Cf. Cahoy, supra note 11, at 134-36 (arguing that international intellectual
property law provides an effective protection of innovation but fails to address
public health issues).
53. Jon Cohen, Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma Patents, 316 SCIENCE
816 (2007); KEITH ALCORN, Brazil Issues Compulsory License on Efavirenz,
AIDSMAP NEWS, May 7, 2007, http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/0550CE623F90-4603-932C-EF69E1B4485D.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
54. Cohen, supra note 53, at 816.
55. For example, in April 2007, “the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
“cited Thailand’s issuing of compulsory licenses as one reason for elevating the
country to the dreaded Priority Watch List, a U.S. government warning to
countries that it judges do not adequately protect intellectual property, which can
drive away investment and impact export tariffs.” Id.
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world,” and emphasized that “[t]his decision . . . will have a negative
impact on Brazil’s reputation as an industrialized country seeking to
attract inward investment.”56
The Brazilian example highlights the tensions between private
rights and public motives inherent in compulsory licenses. Antony
Taubman has summarized this conflict well, writing that:
The grant of a compulsory licenses is inevitably a contested
issue in trade relations, within or beyond the TRIPS regime,
because it directly calibrates the boundary between legitimate
expectations of patent holders and the public interest, in
exceptional and egregious cases when the interests of
producers and users of technology most closely approach a
zero sum character: in these cases, the presumed systemic
spur to technology diffusion created by an exclusive right in
the hands of the technology developer gives way to a bare
entitlement to adequate remuneration.57
Due to circumstances that may be commonly associated with the
issuance of a compulsory license, in which an investor’s existing IP
rights, investment position, and expectations are curtailed, the
investor may have a strong incentive to seek recourse through
available means of dispute settlement. The WTO’s Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(“DSU”)58 provides for settlement of trade claims between states and
may be relevant if the state authorizing the compulsory license has
failed to comply with the TRIPS Agreement’s requirements.
However, the foreign investor may wish to consider bringing a claim
56. Press Release, Merck & Co., Statement on Brazilian Government's
Decision To Issue Compulsory License for Stocrin (May 4, 2007), available at
http://www.drugs.com/news/merck-amp-co-inc-statement-brazilian-government-sdecision-issue-compulsory-license-stocrin-6088.html. Merck is a global
pharmaceutical company with its corporate headquarters in New Jersey. As of
June 2009, Brazil had entered into only fourteen BITs, but no BIT with the United
States.
UNCTAD,
Country-specific
Lists
of
BITs,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1
(select
“Brazil” in drop down list titled “BITs signed by each country are available
below”) (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
57. Taubman, supra note 14, at 942-43.
58. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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in investor-state arbitration directly against the host state. Part II
discusses relevant issues in weighing the alternative of investment
arbitration for compulsory licenses implicating circumstances of
indirect expropriation.

II. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES INVOLVING
COMPULSORY LICENSES—THE CASE OF
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION
Intellectual property disputes are often resolved through private
party litigation in the national courts of a country where the IPR
owner’s rights are recognized as legally valid and where jurisdiction
over the particular defendant is proper. Many such disputes involve
the IP owner suing an unrelated third party for alleged violation of
the owner’s IPRs. A typical claim, for example, involves allegations
of infringement: company B, through the unauthorized exploitation
or use of a particular technology, is alleged to have infringed on the
patent rights of company A. Such disputes arise between parties that
may have no contractual relationship. Without contractual privity,
there is no opportunity for the parties to agree on the proper forum
and dispute settlement procedures prior to their dispute. While the
parties can, at the time of a dispute, voluntarily consent to participate
in a mediation or arbitration procedure, this is uncommon.59
Against these archetypal intellectual property dispute
circumstances, the investor-state dispute settlement framework
introduces an enforcement mechanism for IP owners engaged in
foreign investment. For a claim arising from government conduct
that allegedly has a harmful impact on the IP-based investment—
such as the issuance of a compulsory license over a foreign
investor’s patents that comprise an integral part of the foreign

59. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the
Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 559, 567-68 (2001) (examining arbitration agreements in the
employment context and observing that differences in the interests of the parties
involved often render post-dispute arbitration agreements difficult and impractical
to negotiate). However, there may be circumstances in which, due to a pre-existing
arbitration agreement, an intellectual property dispute may find its way to
arbitration. The Arbitration and Mediation Center of the WIPO was established in
1994 with this idea in mind. See WIPO, WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr.,
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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investment—grounds may exist under an IIA to support a claim that
may be brought directly against the host state in arbitration. The vast
majority of IIAs contain dispute settlement provisions in which
governments give their consent that, should an investment dispute
arise with a qualifying private investor from another contracting
state, they will submit to international arbitration.60 Indeed, it has
been emphasized that “[t]his widespread pattern of consent to
arbitration of investment disputes is one of the more remarkable
developments in international law in the past 40 years.”61
Nonetheless, this investor-state dispute settlement framework has yet
to be tested in connection with an IP-based investment dispute.
Potential limiting factors could include whether the investor had
obtained protection for its intellectual property in the host state,62 as
well as the nature of the investment itself.63 Almost by definition,
however, if a compulsory license has been authorized by the host
state as to an investor’s patent (or patents), this authorization implies
that the investor had secured protection in the host state.
I turn now to address a number of specific issues for investment
disputes involving compulsory licenses, review the core standards of
protection available under IIAs, and, in particular, analyze

60. See LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 35, 40-41 (2004)
(explaining that “recurring provisions” in treaties often grant investors access to
arbitration); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1529, 1539-40 (2005) (describing the grant of
substantive rights and the provision of dispute mechanisms as “fundamental
innovations” of investment treaties); see also UNCTAD, INVESTOR–STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND IMPACT ON INVESTMENT RULEMAKING 7-8,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (2007) [Hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
RULEMAKING] (noting that investor-state arbitration has increased “enormously”
since the late 1990s due, in part, to increased international investment combined
with an increasing number of IIAs).
61. BISHOP ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
62. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing intellectual property as
an investment).
63. While intellectual property forms a more significant dimension of the
modern economy, the investment areas that have experienced disputes thus far
“include construction, water and sewage services, brewing, telecommunications
concessions, banking and financial services, hotel management, television and
radio broadcasting, hazardous waste management, textile production, gas and oil
production, and various forms of mining.” UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes and
Policy Implications, ¶ 11, TD/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 14, 2005).
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application of expropriation standards to compulsory licensing
circumstances.

A. STANDARDS OF PROTECTION UNDER IIAS
A recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(“UNCTAD”) study observed that the universe of IIAs is becoming
increasingly complex.64 There is no central body or state to
coordinate, regulate, or provide a framework for the structure or
content of these thousands of agreements.65 Instead, the system is
“atomized,” and almost every nation has signed one IIA, while a
majority of nations have signed numerous IIAs.66 Despite the lack of
central coordination, the concomitant efforts of countries entering
into these agreements while following each others’ examples has
generated a pattern of agreements that reveal a strong degree of
uniformity on the core protective standards concerning treatment of
foreign investors and their investments.67 Aside from the dispute
settlement provisions providing for arbitration noted above, these
core standards often include the following terms:


fair and equitable treatment;



full protection and security;



national treatment and non-discrimination: treatment
as favorable as that accorded to the country’s own
citizens, while avoiding arbitrary or discriminatory
measures;



most favored nation (“MFN”) treatment: treatment as
favorable as that accorded to other countries’ citizens;

64. UNCTAD, Development Implications of International Investment
Agreements, IIA Monitor No. 2 (2007) Int’l Inv. Agreements, at 2,
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/2 (2007) [hereinafter Development Implications].
As noted above, the IIA universe of agreements is “multi-layered,” with “IIA[]
exist[ing] at the bilateral, regional, interregional, sectoral, plurilateral and
multilateral levels, often resulting in overlapping commitments of countries.” Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. (commenting that the IIA system displays “uniformity at the core,
but increasing variation at the periphery”).
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minimum standard of treatment in accordance with
international law; and,



defining conditions under which property may be
expropriated with the guaranty of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation.68

377

There is increasing concern for “policy coherence”69 with respect
to the core standards, as they implicate public international law and
may be less amenable to clear definition than is the case for certain
rights in private law.70 These concerns multiply as the proliferation in
the number of IIAs has been accompanied by the sharp rise in the
number of disputes arising under IIAs.71
Where it has been considered at all in the investment dispute
context, the compulsory license has been examined in relation to
potential claims of expropriation. The minimum standard of
treatment in accordance with international law may operate as a
choice-of-law provision, importing customary international law, or
even possibly non-investment international law such as the TRIPS
Agreement, into the analysis as a floor for treatment of investments.72
I address the applicable law issue both in this Part and in Part III

68. Id.; BISHOP ET AL., supra note 5, at 10, 1007; UNCTAD, International
Investment Rulemaking, TD/B/COM.2/EM.21/2 (May 22, 2007); see also Kenneth
J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 469, 470 (2000) (remarking that many of the agreements on these core issues
are based on principles that developing states had rejected in the past, such as
requiring effective compensation for expropriated investments).
69. See Development Implications, supra note 64, at 4 (stressing the need for
states to ensure that their various IIAs are in line with their national development
goals).
70. See Franck, supra note 60, at 1558-82 (comparing the Lauder Arbitrations,
the SGS cases, and NAFTA cases to illustrate the inconsistent outcomes of
investment treaty arbitration on disputes revolving around public international
law); BISHOP ET AL., supra note 5, at 10 (explaining that the precise meaning of
certain of the core protective standards is “a matter of some debate and [that they]
are still being developed”).
71. See INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, supra note 60, at 7-8
(noting that the increase in investment disputes has led to interpretive rulings that
have prompted countries to re-examine their obligations under the agreements and
has caused particularly challenging financial implications for developing nations).
72. See BISHOP ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1008 (acknowledging that a “minimum
standard of international law” is a controversial concept).
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discussing the interplay between protection against expropriation
under IIAs and the TRIPS Agreement.

B. INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION
Those commentators who have considered the issue of the
compulsory license with respect to expropriation have focused on
indirect expropriation.73 As discussed above, a compulsory license
does not result in a transfer of legal title and thus does not formally
deprive the IP owner of ownership rights over the protected
intellectual property. For this reason, a government’s authorization of
a compulsory license does not fall within the scope of direct
expropriation, which normally requires the state to transfer legal title
of the private property to itself or to a third party.74 Instead, the
central question is whether the compulsory license amounts to an
indirect expropriation. UNCTAD reports that “the lack of clarity
concerning the degree of interference with rights of ownership that is
required for an act or series of acts to constitute an indirect
expropriation has been one of the most controversial issues during
the last decade.”75 There is no “mechanical formula” for determining
whether one or more state acts may amount to an indirect
expropriation, and it has been observed accordingly that “state

73. See, e.g., Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng, IP Rights Under Investment
Agreements: The TRIPS-Plus Implications for Enforcement and Protections of
Public Interest 18 (Res. Paper No. 8, S. Centre, 2006), at 18, available at
http://www.southcentre.org/index2.php?option
=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=86 (advancing the argument that compulsory
licensing is “beyond the realm of direct expropriation” because it only provides an
exception to exclusive right without depriving ownership); Correa, Investment
Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements, supra note 3, at 348-51
(reasoning that a mere adverse effect on an investment through compulsory license
does not rise to the level of indirect expropriation); Tsai-Yu Lin, supra note 7, at
155-58 (explaining that it is difficult to draw a line between expropriation and
legitimate governmental action not requiring compensation, and analyzing the
possibility of compulsory license qualifying as an indirect expropriation).
74. Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in
International Law, 20 ICSID REV. FOR. INV. L.J. 1, 9-11 (2005).
75. See INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, supra note 60, at 75-76
(remarking that recent IIAs contain provisions to clarify what constitutes indirect
expropriation so as to prevent ambiguity).
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measures that can potentially impact upon an investor’s rights in its
investment are too varied to fit into a neat formula.”76 In this context,
the compulsory license presents an example of specialized
circumstances in which a state measure can impact upon an
investor’s rights: the compulsory license can be viewed as yet
another form of government interference that may be considered
within the broader context of the more recent and modern cases
addressing issues of indirect or “regulatory” expropriation.
In view of the difficulties of determining indirect expropriation,
the logical starting point in the analysis is the language of the IIA
itself. Virtually all IIAs (and most particularly BITs) contain
substantially similar, if not verbatim, provisions on expropriation.77
The expropriation term from the recent China-Germany BIT, which
entered into force in November 2005, illustrates a common approach
to confirm protection in the cases of direct or indirect expropriation.
Article 4(2) provides in relevant part that:
Investments by investors of either Contracting Party shall not
directly or indirectly be expropriated, nationalized or
subjected to any other measure the effects of which would be
tantamount to expropriation or nationalization in the territory
of the other Contracting Party (hereinafter referred to as
expropriation) except for the public benefit and against
compensation. Such compensation shall be equivalent to the
value of the investment immediately before the expropriation
76. Jan Paulsson & Zachary Douglas, Indirect Expropriation in Investment
Treaty Arbitrations, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 145, 145-46
(Norbert Horn & Stefan Kröll eds., 2004) (contending that a flexible measure
which takes into account the facts and circumstances of each case is necessary).
Paulsson and Douglas write that:
Indirect expropriations affect property interests in more subtle ways. Legal
title to the property is not disturbed. Rather, its income producing potential is
somehow diminished by acts attributable to the Host State. This trend has
exposed the limitations of a purely legal or formalistic concept of property
that is not sensitive to the economic rights or expectations associated with the
property.
Id. at 152.
77. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 476 (2002)
(observing that these standard terms establish what constitutes lawful expropriation
under the BIT and explaining that expropriation is not necessarily conflict with
BITs where expropriation “(i) is carried out for a public purpose; (ii) is nondiscriminatory; (iii) is carried out in accordance with due process, and (iv) is
accompanied by payment of compensation”).
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is taken or the threatening expropriation has become publicly
known, whichever is earlier.78
While this provision expressly covers indirect expropriations and
“any other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to
expropriation or nationalization,” there is no guidance on how this
treaty standard should be applied in relation to specific
circumstances, such as a government authorization of a compulsory
license.79 The compulsory license brings to mind the difficult
exercise of drawing a line between a compensable indirect
expropriation, on the one hand, and a legitimate and uncompensable
regulation, on the other. If a dispute arose under the China-Germany
BIT and arbitration was commenced before the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”),80 a threshold
question would be the applicable law providing guidance in
78. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, P.R.C.-F.R.G., art. 4(2), Dec. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections
/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_germany.pdf [hereinafter China-Germany 2003 BIT]
(emphasis added). It is also notable that the China-Germany 2003 BIT provides in
Article 4(3) that “Investors . . . shall enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment in the
territory of the other Contracting Party in respect of the matters provided for in this
Article [on expropriation].” Id. art. 4(3). A most favored nation (“MFN”)
provision in an IIA attempts to create equality among foreign investors by
requiring the host state to extend to the contracting foreign state’s investors
treatment no less favorable than it offers investors from any third country. Correa,
Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements, supra note 3, at
342. Thus, just like any other claim that an investor might bring, to the extent that
a claimed founded on a compulsory license might benefit from application of the
terms of protection concerning expropriation found in another IIA, the investor
may seek to have that same level of protection applied in relation to a dispute
arising under the China-Germany 2003 BIT surrounding the circumstances of a
compulsory license.
79. See Newcombe, supra note 74, at 22-23 (“[I]nvestment treaties typically do
not define the meaning of expropriation and often simply refer to government
measures that are the ‘same’ or ‘equivalent’ to expropriation or are ‘tantamount to
expropriation.’”). The United States Model BIT, which served as the model for
U.S.-Uruguay BIT, provides more detailed guidance and specifically addresses the
compulsory license. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 3, Annex B; see also discussion
infra Part II.C.
80. See China-Germany 2003 BIT, supra note 78, art. 9(3) (providing for
ICSID arbitration as the default dispute resolution mechanism absent amicable
settlement). The Protocol to the China-Germany 2003 BIT adds additional
conditions that must be met with respect to a claim brought by a German investor
for an investment in China. Id. at Protocol, ¶ 6.
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determining the expropriation question. Article 42 of the ICSID
Convention provides that, unless the parties agreed on applicable
law, the tribunal will apply the law of the host state “and such rules
of international law as may be applicable.”81 It is widely accepted
that this reference to international law brings a “supplemental and
corrective effect” to the extent that a host state’s domestic law has
gaps or leads to violations of international law.82
Andrew Newcombe has summarized the orthodox approach under
international law for defining indirect expropriation, also known as
the “sole effect doctrine.”83 He quotes from Starrett Housing
Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Iran to re-state the general
standard:
[It] is recognized in international law that measures taken by

a state can interfere with property rights to such an extent that
these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed
to have been expropriated, even though the state does not
purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the
property formally remains with the original owner.84
From his review of cases, Newcombe summarizes that in most
instances where expropriation is found, “the investor has suffered a
deprivation and there has been a corresponding acquisition of use or
control of the investment by the state,” although in a few cases where
there was no state acquisition, there was “extreme and arbitrary
interference with property rights.”85 Importantly, he also refers to
recent cases in which there were state representations or approval of

81. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 42(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention].
82. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 623
(2001). Relevant international law for a claim of expropriation in connection with
a compulsory license may be deemed to include the TRIPS Agreement, either as a
result of the parties’ agreement or as a reference point for interpretive guidance.
See discussion infra, Part III.
83. See Newcombe, supra note 74, at 9-11 (emphasizing that this approach
focuses on the effect of the state action on the investor's property rights in
determining whether indirect expropriation occurred).
84. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Starrett Housing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 122, 154 (1983)).
85. Id. at 11-12.
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a particular investment, followed by subsequent state interference.86
The critical observation is that these “deprivations were the result of
the government reneging on a previous contractual commitment or
authorization.”87 In this way, the state’s decision to revoke a
previously granted right does not differ in its effects from the indirect
appropriation or acquisition of that previously granted approval or
authorization by the state.88
This last line of reasoning is similar to the analysis presented by
Paulsson and Douglas in their article, Indirect Expropriation in
Investment Treaty Arbitrations.89 The authors start by describing
their view of two primary stages of analysis for an indirect
expropriation. First, “the analysis should focus on the nature or
magnitude of the interference to the investor’s property interests in
its investment caused by measures attributable to the Host State to
determine whether those acts amount to a taking.”90 Second, there
should be a determination of “whether this taking or interference
rises to the level of an expropriation by reference to the relevant
treaty standard.”91 In their second stage, similar to Newcombe’s
approach, Paulsson and Douglas focus on “specific undertakings or
representations” the state made to the investor and the “legitimate
reliance or expectations” of the investor which were subsequently
disappointed by the state interference.92
In my discussion below, I rely on these two stages of analysis to
examine compulsory licenses and consider whether, in certain
circumstances, they may constitute an indirect expropriation.
However, I add a third factor to this analysis: the character and
regulatory purpose behind the government action. The “character” of
86. See id. at 13-14 (identifying this type of expropriation as one of two broad
categories of recent cases resulting in an investment treaty award, the other type
being the state’s outright appropriation of the property).
87. Id. at 13.
88. See id. at 19 (“The question is: under what circumstances should a
government, in acquiring or destroying an investment, be governed by market rules
(a liability to compensate)? Further, when is it justified in not compensating?").
89. Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 76.
90. Id. at 148.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 154-57 (asserting that the existence of these “undertakings or
representations” in conjunction with “reliance or expectations” support a finding of
indirect expropriation.)
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a compulsory license has been described above, but there can be
diverse regulatory motives for issuing a compulsory license. This
three-part analytical framework—which, again, examines whether
the level of deprivation constitutes a taking, whether the deprivation
rises to the level of an indirect expropriation, and the character of the
government action—is very similar to the three factors set out in the
Annex B on expropriation in recent United States BITs, discussed
below.93
1. Level of Deprivation Constitute a Taking?
Regarding the first stage of analysis, Paulsson and Douglas urge a
modern and expansive view of property rights that might be subject
to taking, quoting Professor Waelde and Dr. Kolo: “[T]he key
function of property is less the tangibility of ‘things’, but rather the
capability of a combination of rights in a commercial and corporate
setting and under a regulatory regime to earn a commercial rate of
return.”94 Under this view, a government-authorized compulsory
license may operate to undermine an essential element of a patentbased investment: the patent rights (i.e., legal monopoly and
protection) granted with respect to the invention, which support the
commercial leverage necessary to exploit the invention as an integral
part of an investment in the foreign market. The compulsory license,
thus, can undercut the ability to earn a certain level of return, which
may diminish the value of the patent-based investment. It is clear that
the grant of a compulsory license can, indeed, “cause an adverse
93. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 3, Annex B, ¶ 4(a) (providing three factors
to consider in determining whether a government action constitutes an indirect
expropriation: (1) the economic impact of the measure, (2) the degree of
interference with reasonable investor expectations, and (3) the character of the
measure).
94. Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 76, at 152-53 (quoting Thomas Waelde &
Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory
Taking’ in International Law, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 811, 835 (2001)); see also
Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, ICSID Final Award of the Tribunal
on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1455, pt. IV, ch. D, ¶¶ 7-8 (Aug. 3,
2005) (“[T]he restrictive notion of property as a material ‘thing’ is obsolete and
has ceded its place to a contemporary conception which includes managerial
control over components of a process that is wealth producing. In the view of the
Tribunal, items such as goodwill and market share may . . . ‘constitute an element
of the value of an enterprise and as such may have been covered by some of the
compensation payments.’”) (citation omitted).
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effect on the economic value of a patented product and interfere with
the patent holder’s ability to use or enjoy its patent in a given
market.”95
The degree of interference caused by the compulsory license will
be directly dependent upon the compulsory license’s terms, including
the scope and duration of the license, those parties authorized by the
government to make use under the license, and any remuneration to
be paid to the investor owning the IPR. These (and possibly other
relevant) terms will go a long way toward determining, on the
specific facts, whether a regulatory “taking” has occurred. For
example, the level of compensation (e.g., through lump-sum payment
or royalties) offered by the terms of a compulsory license, if de
minimis or nothing, may in certain circumstances be a determining
factor in whether the license is viewed as a taking. In this respect,
traditional analysis of expropriation requires that there be a
“substantial deprivation” to the investor.96 Combining a modern view
95. Tsai-Yu Lin, supra note 7 at 157.
96. See LOWENFELD, supra note 77, at 478 (reviewing the evolving definition
of expropriation under international law, especially in relation to agreements such
as NAFTA). The level of deprivation presents a question of degree in the
expropriation analysis. As Lowenfeld puts it:
[I]ntangible rights, such as the right to import or export a given product or to
participate in a given industry, may be subject to the constraints on
expropriation set out in the BITs. However, a regulation of temporary
duration, or a regulation that reduces the profitability of an investment but
does not shut it down completely and leaves the investor in control, will
generally not be seen as an expropriation, even when it gives rise to liability
on the part of the host state for violation of the national treatment and fair and
equitable treatment clauses.
Id. at 480. But see Michael Ewing-Chow, Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis:
Investor Protection in BITs, WTO and FTAs, 30 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 548, 55657 (2007) (observing that in a line of recent cases, courts have found government
acts to constitute indirect expropriation of an investor's property rights by requiring
diminished showings of deprivation). For example, the ICSID tribunal in
Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States created a stir when it implied in the
following statement that a somewhat lower or more flexible standard of
deprivation might pertain to justify a finding of expropriation:
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or
obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonablyto-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the
obvious benefit of the host State.
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of property rights necessary to comprehend the value of a patentbased investment with an understanding of the particular terms of the
compulsory license should enable an investment tribunal to
determine whether a taking has occurred.
2. Rise to the Level of an Indirect Expropriation?
As to the second stage of analysis (whether the taking rises to the
level of an indirect expropriation), Paulsson and Douglas focus on
two elements that reflect similarity to Andrew Newcombe’s analysis.
To determine an indirect expropriation, tribunals in cases such as
Metalclad Corp. v. The United States of Mexico97 have focused on (i)
“specific undertakings or representations on the part of the state,”
and (ii) “legitimate or reasonable expectations and reliance on the
part of the investor.”98 A case where these factors are present differs
from one where there have been no state representations or approvals
to the investor and a non-discriminatory change is made in a
regulation, such as a tax rule, in which an investor may have no
legitimate expectation in an unchanging status quo regime.99 In this
respect, “[i]nvestments entail risk,”100 including the latent possibility
that such regulatory changes may occur.

ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (August 30, 2000), ¶ 103 (emphasis
added).
97. Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award.
98. Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 76, at 154. The question of legitimate
expectation is fundamentally one of risk allocation. This factor has been adopted
in recent US investment treaty practice by mandating tribunals to consider, inter
alia, “the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable
investment-backed expectations.” U.S. Model BIT, supra note 3, Annex B, ¶
4(a)(ii); Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, U.S.-Uru., Annex B, ¶ 4(a)(ii), Nov. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Uruguay.pdf
[hereinafter
U.S.-Uruguay BIT]; cf. Newcombe, supra note 74, at 32, 35 (calling the question
of what level of risk and harm are necessary to justify expropriation without
compensation “one of the more controversial issues in investment treaty
arbitration”).
99. See Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 76, at 155 (discussing Marvin
Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award (Dec. 16, 2002),
which held that the Mexican government's change in tax rebate policy did not
constitute an indirect expropriation because (1) tax laws and regulations are subject
to change and (2) Feldman had no legitimate expectation that the Mexican tax
rules would continue without change).
100. See Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 76, at 157.
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While this framework of factors is not intended by authors
Newcombe, Paulsson, and Douglas as an exclusive test for indirect
expropriation,101 it provides a useful modern lens through which to
consider the circumstances involving a government’s authorization
of a compulsory license. For example, we can ask the following
questions for a patent-based foreign investment:
(i)

Does a foreign government’s grant of patent rights to
an inventor for a particular invention qualify as the
type of representation, authorization, or undertaking
to the inventor that is cognizable within the indirect
expropriation analysis outlined above?; and

(ii)

Is it legitimate and reasonable for the inventor to rely
on the foreign government’s grant of patent rights
throughout the length of the patent’s term, even in
association with a decision to exploit the patent rights
as an integral part of a foreign investment?

I would argue that the answer to each of these questions is a
qualified “yes.” First, the government’s grant of patent rights confers
a legal monopoly within the host state that is specific to the invention
covered by the particular patent. Although the rights conveyed by a
patent may vary somewhat from country to country, in general, the
patent is a specific legal property right that the government grants to
the inventor in exchange for the inventor’s agreement to share the
details of the invention with the public.102 The grant of the patent is
an approval or authorization made by the government only after the
inventor has followed a set of procedures to apply for the patent.103
The investor thus acquires a specific legal right after approval from
the state.
Second, a patent provides the right to exclude others from
“making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing” the patented

101. See id. (stating that the test is not exclusive, but rather serves as useful
guidance that can be widely applicable to many different situations).
102. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 28-29 (granting exclusive rights
through Article 28, but requiring “clear and complete” disclosure of the invention
in Article 29).
103. The procedure for granting patents, the requirements placed on the
patentee, and the extent of the exclusive rights vary between countries according to
national laws and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.
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invention for the term of the patent, which is twenty years from the
filing date of the patent for countries that are members of the
WTO.104 Unlike other areas of the law, the length and scope of
protection for a patent is not an element that is easily susceptible to
regulatory change, as may be the case with the tax code or other
government regulations. While it may be unreasonable to expect that
tax regulations will never change, reliance on the specific rights and
length of protection associated with a patent is a very different
matter.105 Given the consistent and well-harmonized treatment under
the law, the inventor is reasonably entitled to rely on the foreign
government’s grant of patent rights throughout the length of the
patent’s term, and, in particular, in connection with a decision to
exploit the patent rights through a foreign investment.106 To the
extent that the compulsory license “reneges” on these fundamental
patent rights, Newcombe’s analysis would suggest that this
interference with the previously granted right, if sufficiently severe
(as discussed above), may be conceptually similar to the state’s
indirect appropriation or acquisition of the previously granted right,
presenting a case of quasi-appropriation.107 By severely interfering
with the patent rights, the government concerned may be “essentially
reacquiring rights that it can use or grant to another party in the
future.”108
My answer above presented a qualified “yes.” The qualification
relates to the national intellectual property law regulating patents in
the investor’s host state and any limitations or exceptions that may
be contained in that law with respect to patent rights.109 “A
104. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 28, 33.
105. Cf. Tsai-Yu Lin, supra note 7, at 157-58 (asserting that a host country’s
codification of a law authorizing compulsory licenses would materially interfere
with a pre-existing investor’s expectations because such a situation is
unforeseeable).
106. A government may also have made other specific representations in
connection with the patent-based investment, such as permits or licenses for the
establishment of a manufacturing facility that uses the relevant technology. These
representations would also be weighed.
107. Newcombe, supra note 74, at 19.
108. Id. Yet another complementary analysis would be to evaluate the degree to
which the compulsory license represents use or control of the investor’s patent
rights by the host state.
109. More broadly, when a foreign investor invests in a host state, it “acquire[s]
rights subject to the existing domestic regulatory framework.” Id. at 28. In this
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wholehearted patent system will contain nothing that fetters a
patentee’s power to act as a monopolist,” to the extent permitted by
the law.110 However, if the national patent law contains exceptions or
limitations, this could be relevant to the issues at hand.111 In
particular, if the national patent law has a provision regulating
compulsory licenses, it will spell out the terms under which a
compulsory license may be issued by the government. An investor’s
reasonable reliance on patent rights in connection with an investment
could thus be influenced or conditioned by the state’s regulatory
framework for patents. The normal length and scope of protection of
patent rights under the law must be assessed in combination with
those exceptional circumstances and terms, which the law indicates
might justify a compulsory license. For most countries (and
particularly those that are members of WTO), it is too much to say
that the possibility of compulsory licenses—which to date have been
authorized by governments only in very exceptional circumstances—
fundamentally undermines the stability of the patent regime and
thereby makes unreasonable the reliance that an investor might
otherwise place on its patent rights when making an investment.112 In
case, part of a patent-based investment will depend on the national patent law.
“International law looks to domestic law to determine the scope of acquired
rights.” Id.
110. CORNISH, supra note 23, at 290.
111. See Newcombe, supra note 74, at 27-28 (noting that, according to Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), nuisance law places a
limitation on property rights such that the right to create nuisance is not among the
property ownership rights, and, therefore, a property holder cannot claim a taking
if government regulation later prohibits such nuisance). “[A] taking occurs where a
government measure that does not represent a pre-existing lawful limitation on use
results in property being completely drained of economic value.” Id. at 28
(emphasis added).
112. Cf. Tsai-Yu Lin, supra note 7, at 157 (suggesting that the existence of
compulsory license provisions in the patent law system of a host state means that
the “investor should be in position to be able to foresee that the compulsory license
law is applicable and will have associated effects,” such that investors “should
have reasonably expected that the existence of a compulsory license law will create
associated effects, and should take this into consideration before making any
investment decision”). In my view, this approach gives insufficient recognition to
the law and practice on compulsory licenses in the vast majority of countries,
which permits their issuance only in exceptional circumstances. Except in the case
of a limited number of countries, I would not agree that an investor should
“reasonably expect” that the existence of a compulsory license law will
substantially undermine that investor’s “distinct, reasonable investment-backed
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this respect, the legitimate expectations of patent holders are wellfortified by the law and practice in the vast majority of countries, at
least up to the point at which use of the patent rights may be
determined to be abusive (e.g., unfair trade or antitrust concerns).
Moreover, to the extent that a country’s national patent law, or the
government’s authorization of a compulsory license, is inconsistent
with international law, the patent owner, as foreign investor, may
also take into account that it is able to claim rights under the
international standard through either the WTO system or investment
arbitration.113 This dimension may also fortify the investor’s reliance
on its patent rights.
3. Character of Government Action—Regulatory Purpose
While the two-stage analysis discussed above is helpful in
analyzing potential indirect expropriation issues associated with the
compulsory license, there remains at least one other important factor.
As the compulsory license may present a case of indirect or
regulatory expropriation, a dispute settlement tribunal may consider
not only (i) the impact of the government-authorized compulsory
license on the investment (i.e., the level of deprivation) and (ii)
whether the investor’s expectations and reliance on the patent rights
as a basis for investment are reasonable and legitimate, but also (iii)
the character of the government action, including the regulatory
purpose behind the compulsory license. This factor shares
importance with the other two in assessing whether the compulsory
license should be considered an indirect expropriation entitled to
compensation or not.
Newcombe provides a useful discussion of this element, stating
that regulatory purpose “is relevant in assessing whether noncompensation can be justified under police powers.”114 The

expectations” founded on its patent rights. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 3, Annex
B, ¶ 4(a)(ii).
113. See discussion infra Part III (considering the possibility that if the host state
is a member of the WTO, one or both parties may attempt to make reference to the
standards set forth in Article 31 to justify their respective positions).
114. Newcombe, supra note 74, at 41. “Evidence of [the State’s] intent has been
an issue in many indirect expropriation cases.” Id. at 25 n.106. The term “police
powers” has been used generally to refer to “all forms of domestic regulation under
a state’s sovereign powers,” but it can also be used more narrowly in the
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“purpose” is particularly germane to compulsory licenses, as
governments can authorize them for diverse reasons. The TRIPS
Agreement, as discussed above,115 lists grounds that may be relied
upon for issuance of the compulsory license, including circumstances
of national emergency or extreme urgency, public non-commercial
use, remedying anti-competitive practices, or permitting the
exploitation of an important dependency patent. In a dispute, each of
these particular justifications would entail consideration of detailed
facts in the particular case (e.g., the circumstances of a public health
emergency or the merger of two market-dominant firms raising
antitrust concerns) and would weigh differently in the calculus of
deciding whether to compensate, and if so, at what level.
Newcombe reviews international law authorities for the
proposition that no right of compensation may arise for bona fide
government regulations that are reasonably necessary and enacted to
preserve public health, safety, morals, or welfare, or that are “nondiscriminatory and . . . within the commonly accepted taxation and
police powers of states.”116 Still, he observes that the application of
this principle “is anything but clear.”117 And, indeed, a blanket
exception for non-discriminatory regulatory measures would leave a
gap in international laws aimed at preventing or remedying
expropriation.118 Newcombe uses the example of a distinction
between a government ban on the use of a chemical because
evidence reveals that the chemical is carcinogenic, versus a ban
“motivated by a desire to protect the market share of a competing
chemical produced by a state-owned industry.”119 The identical
government intervention—a ban on the chemical—is motivated by
very different reasons. “Where the government is acting for
economic purposes—to create local industry or protect domestic
production—the police power cannot be used to justify noninvestment law context to refer to “measures that justify a state action that would
otherwise amount to a compensable deprivation or appropriation of property.” Id.
at 26.
115. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
116. Newcombe, supra note 74, at 29 (quoting George H. Aldrich, What
Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 609 (1994)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id. at 41.
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compensation.”120 Similarly, a compulsory license authorized by a
host government for economic purposes, such as obtaining more
favorable financial terms for domestic firms seeking access to
patented technology, would be extremely unlikely to find
justification for non-compensation. Where the government is acting
as an “enterpriser”121 and acquiring some form of technology for
public benefit—such as access to the technology on terms that reflect
little or no compensation—there could be a presumption that it
should pay compensation. In this instance, the government is
indirectly “acquiring” rights (i.e., the right to use or license the
patent) that comprise a key part of the patent-based investment,
particularly when it would result is in an unjust enrichment to the
investor’s substantial detriment.
One further difficulty is ascertaining the proper characterization of
the government measure in relation to the purposes behind it.122
There may be more than one purpose behind the authorization of a
compulsory license. A compulsory license authorized for putative
national security reasons may also serve a local protectionist
purpose. Part of the rationale for issuance of the compulsory license
may be difficult to discern or intentionally oblique. To the extent that
an investor can show closely related elements such as bad faith,
discrimination, or disregard of legitimate expectations on the part of
the state, these may weigh heavily as an investment tribunal
considers the state’s motivation behind the license.
Public health concerns are commonly believed to be adequate
grounds for authorizing compulsory licenses.123 As noted above, this
has been an area sparking tense debate in trade and intellectual
property law under the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement and Doha

120. Id.
121. Id. at 42.
122. Id. at 41.
123. See Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements,
supra note 3, at 349 (justifying the authorization of a compulsory license where
doing so would be in the public interest, such as in the face of a public health
emergency); Tsai-Yu Lin, supra note 7, at 153-54 (citing the beneficial use of
compulsory licenses among developing states to secure access to less expensive,
generic formulations of life-saving medicines). See generally Bartelt, supra note
11 (discussing the conflicting interests of developing countries and pharmaceutical
parent holders in the arena of compulsory licensing).
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Declaration.124 While two of the elements in the three-factor
framework discussed above—the level of adverse economic effect
(e.g., severe deprivation) on the patent-based investor and state
representations through the specific grant of patent rights—may
weigh in one direction, perhaps towards a finding of indirect
expropriation, the public interest purpose behind authorization of the
compulsory license, such as to meet the needs of a public health
emergency, may pull markedly in the other direction. In such
context, should the level of compensation and other relevant terms
established by the compulsory license “be given a humanitarian
reading, guided also by the broader human rights context?”125 Even
so, does there still need to be “adequate remuneration” of legitimate
and irreducible, if clearly bounded, patent rights?126 Moreover, a state
measure to override patent rights through a compulsory license in
order to provide improved access to medical technology or drugs
nonetheless implicates significant commercial matters not lacking in
economic value. As may be seen, complex facts, including the
availability and pricing of certain patented technologies or drugs,
scientific evidence as to their efficacy, the length and terms of the
compulsory license, as well as information about the health crisis and
market-based factors, may need to be considered in relation to a
compulsory license addressing urgent health concerns that has an
impact on a patent-based foreign investment. In the end, the
determination will have to be made case-by-case, based on the
specific facts.127 A careful weighing of the three factors discussed
here will be helpful to determine whether the compulsory license in
question not only amounts to a taking, but, if so, whether it also
constitutes an indirect expropriation for which compensation may be
owed.

124. See sources cited supra note 11.
125. Taubman, supra note 14, at 963.
126. See id. at 970 (positing that “adequate remuneration” in the TRIPS context
means an amount that “ensures no prejudice to legitimate expectations of
commercial opportunity”).
127. See Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements,
supra note 3, at 348 (asserting that adverse economic consequences resulting from
government acts are, on their own, insufficient to establish de facto or indirect
expropriation, which requires individualized consideration of a measure’s effects
before determining whether an expropriation has occurred).
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Finally, the three-factor analysis is also relevant with regard to
anti-competitive behavior. A tribunal can consider the level of
deprivation imposed by the compulsory license, as well as the
investor’s reasonable reliance on the patent-based investment.
However, the facts may show that the firm in question has been
abusing its patent rights. The tribunal can thus consider the motives
behind issuance of the compulsory license, such as concerns of
unfair competition or improper attainment of market dominance
(e.g., in the case of a proposed merger), thereby potentially impeding
competition between firms.128 Again, a careful weighing of the three
factors will aid in the determination.
In sum, based on the discussion of the three-factor test above, it is
likely that the issuance of a compulsory license can, in certain
circumstances, constitute an indirect expropriation even though it
may be viewed as a specialized form of exercise of state regulatory
powers. Those who would argue that it can never be considered an
expropriation overstate their claim, while those who suggest that it
must always be considered an expropriation commit an
overstatement from the opposing side of the argument. It has been
suggested more generally in relation to the question of what
constitutes a taking under international law that “the common law
method of case by case development is pre-eminently the best
method, in fact probably the only method, of legal development.”129
This is unquestionably the case, at least at this stage, for
consideration of compulsory licenses.
The TRIPS Agreement, through Article 31 and the Doha
Declaration, provides a powerful backdrop for any discussion of
compulsory licenses, even in the investment law context. In this
section of the paper, I have largely and intentionally avoided
discussing TRIPS Agreement disciplines concerning compulsory
licenses, as may be the case in a dispute between two countries in
128. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31(k) (“The need to correct anticompetitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of
remuneration in such cases.”). In this case, a government intervention to remedy
unfair methods or anti-competitive behavior may mean that the investor should
receive compensation at a discounted level, if at all. Taubman, supra note 14, at
954.
129. George C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under
International Law?, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 307, 338 (1962).
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which the relevant IIA makes no reference to the TRIPS Agreement,
or one or both states are not members of the WTO. The next section,
however, reviews the United States’ current approach to BITs,
which, through express reference, brings the TRIPS Agreement
directly into the investment law context for compulsory licensing
issues.

C. THE MODERN U.S.-URUGUAY BIT AND INDIRECT
EXPROPRIATION
The United States relied on its 2004 model BIT130 as the basis for
reaching an investment treaty with Uruguay, which entered into force
in November 2006.131 For purposes of compulsory licenses, the U.S.Uruguay BIT implemented two important changes from prior
practice. The BIT in Article 6(1) starts with wording on
expropriation that is generally similar, though more detailed, than
that quoted above for the China-Germany BIT:
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered
investment either directly or indirectly through measures
equivalent
to
expropriation
or
nationalization
(“expropriation”), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation; and
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 5(1)
through (3).132

130. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 3.
131. U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 98.
132. Id. art. 6(1) (emphasis added). Articles 5(1) through 5(3) refer to
“treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security.” Id. art. 5(1). “Fair and
equitable treatment” is defined to include “the obligation not to deny justice in
criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the
principle of due process,” while “full protection and security” demands each State
“provide the level of police protection required under customary international
law.” Id. art. 5(2).
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However, as a significant new element, the U.S.-Uruguay BIT has
added additional guidance on expropriation in Annex B.133 The
Annex confirms that Article 6(1) covers two situations: direct and
indirect expropriation.134 An indirect expropriation includes “an
action or series of actions by a Party [that] has an effect equivalent to
direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright
seizure.”135 Similar to the analysis above, the Annex also emphasizes
that the “determination of whether an action or series of actions by a
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect
expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry.”136 The
Annex then lists three factors which, among others, may be
considered:
(i)

the economic impact of the government action,
although the fact that an action or series of actions by
a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of
an investment, standing alone, does not establish that
an indirect expropriation has occurred;

(ii)

the extent to which the government action interferes
with
distinct,
reasonable
investment-backed
expectations; and

(iii)

the character of the government action.137

The Annex also sets forth the presumption that “[e]xcept in rare
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions . . . designed
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.”138
A comparison of the detailed guidance provided in Annex B with
the three-factor analysis discussed above reveals that the Annex adds
very little new to the international legal framework for indirect
expropriation.139 The three factors listed in the Annex are not stated
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. Annex B.
Id. Annex B, ¶¶ 3-4.
Id. Annex B, ¶ 4.
Id. Annex B, ¶ 4(a).
Id.
Id. Annex B, ¶ 4(b).
Cf. Newcombe, supra note 74, at 40-41(believing recent U.S. BITs’
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to be exclusive; however, by compiling them together in one place,
the Annex, in effect, helpfully underscores that their careful and joint
consideration may usefully guide the tribunal’s hand. The additional
presumption of “rare circumstances” for finding an indirect
expropriation in cases of “non-discriminatory regulatory actions”
establishes what has been already recognized as the degree of
regulatory leeway necessary for governments to enact regulation in
areas such as public health, safety, and the environment.
Annex B, however, does “not ‘solve’ [the] hard cases.”140
Moreover, the thrust of this article is to suggest that a compulsory
license, as a specialized form of government intervention, may
commonly present a hard case for decision. As discussed above, the
compulsory license often presents a clash between significant
opposing interests: the legitimate expectations of patent owners
founded on a patent regime that, for well-established reasons,
provides relatively strong and permanent protection during the patent
term, versus the strength of the public interest in exceptional cases,
such as a public health crisis.141 There may be no easy resolution
between these competing interests in the narrow confines of an
adjudicated dispute—indeed, finding some form of win-win strategy
that avoids the dispute settlement mechanisms of investor-state
arbitration or WTO dispute settlement could well serve all parties
and interests.
The U.S.-Uruguay BIT contains a second important element that
directly addresses compulsory licenses and further complicates the
matter. Article 6(5) states:
This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory
licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights in
accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation,
limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the
extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.142

inclusion of the enumerated factors as guidelines for determining whether
expropriation exists has failed to “add anything new to international expropriation
law,” though they may be beneficial to tribunals as guidance).
140. Id. at 41.
141. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
142. U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 98, art. 6(5) (emphasis added). Apart from
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Article 6(5) brings the WTO disciplines directly into play in the
investment dispute context. To the extent that a compulsory license
is TRIPS Agreement compliant, the expropriation provisions in
Article 6 of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT will not apply at all. Yet this
approach, rather than bar any consideration of compulsory licenses in
investment arbitration, merely begs the question of whether the host
state’s issuance of the license is in compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement. That particular issue is still open to challenge.143 Now,
an investor-state tribunal must make a substantive determination with
reference to WTO standards. Moreover, this is not merely some form
of threshold jurisdictional decision. In order to determine if the
compulsory license would meet TRIPS Agreement standards, a
complete set of factual and legal considerations come into play,
especially given the detailed nature of Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which must be read in the context of other potentially
relevant provisions, such as Articles 7, 8, 40 and 42 of the
Agreement.144 Article 6(5) of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT, thus, has the
its focus on compulsory licenses, Article 6(5) also provides some leeway for
governments in their regulation with respect to the “revocation, limitation, or
creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such . . . is consistent with
the TRIPS Agreement.” Id. In addition, although Article 8 of the U.S.-Uruguay
BIT requires that the state parties may not impose requirements to transfer
technology or other proprietary knowledge in connection with an investment, by its
terms, this article does not apply to compulsory licenses issued in accordance with
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Id. arts. 8(1)(f), (3)(b).
143. See Biadgleng, supra note 73, at 17-18 (observing that U.S. BITs with
Jordan and Bahrain are silent as to whether or not TRIPS-compliant compulsory
licenses constitute expropriation, and, even in BITs that explicitly state that
compulsory licenses do not constitute expropriation, such clauses remain
vulnerable to the challenge that the license is contrary to TRIPS). Moreover, as
Taubman recognizes, because “recent BITs explicitly exclude TRIPS-compatible
compulsory licenses from provisions on expropriation[,] . . . [it] implies that
TRIPS-incompatible compulsory licenses may be considered expropriation.”
Taubman, supra note 14, at 964; see also Tsai-Yu Lin, supra note 7, at 159 (“[I]n
the author’s view, such . . . TRIPS-consistent clause[s] seem[ ] not to have the
intention to fully exclude compulsory licenses from the assessment of an
expropriation.”).
144. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 7-8, 40, 42. Article 7 of the TRIPS
Agreement provides that “intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.” Id. art. 7. Article 8 gives Members the right to enact laws “to protect
public health . . . and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
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effect of importing WTO standards, as applicable law, into the
context of the investment dispute concerning a compulsory license.145
The tribunal’s assessment, at least initially, will now focus on the
criteria of Article 31. If a compulsory license is TRIPS Agreement
compliant, an expropriation claim can be dismissed. However, if the
license is determined to be non-compliant, then a claim for indirect
expropriation can proceed. Indeed, one can question whether there
would be anything left to decide under an international investment
law analysis if the compulsory license was found to be noncompliant with TRIPS Agreement standards. Could such a license
fail to meet TRIPS Agreement requirements, yet still fall short of
constituting a taking sufficient to justify the finding of an indirect
expropriation? Or would a tribunal view Article 31 as setting
standards that are directly relevant for the indirect expropriation
analysis to the extent of setting the new standard of attainment under
the U.S.-Uruguay BIT?
For example, if the compulsory license fails to meet the Article
31(h) standard for payment of “adequate remuneration in the
circumstances” to an intellectual property owner,146 should an
investment tribunal determine that there has been an indirect
expropriation and work to craft a remedy that would bring
compensation into line with Article 31, or would it consider a
standard under investment law, such as that in Article 6(1)(c)
specifying “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation,”147 to the
extent there is any difference?148 Article 6(2) of the U.S.-Uruguay
their socio-economic and technological development.” Id. art. 8(1). Article 40
emphasizes that Members may regulate and limit licensing practices that may
“constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market.” Id. art. 40(2). Article 42 provides that
“Members shall make available to right holders civil judicial procedures
concerning the enforcement of any intellectual property right covered by [the
TRIPS] Agreement.” Id. art. 42 (footnote omitted).
145. See Biadgleng, supra note 73, at 26 (noting that, absent a provision
including TRIPS norms by reference, a mere breach of the TRIPS Agreement
would not amount to a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard under
investment rules).
146. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31(h).
147. U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 98, art. 6(1)(c).
148. With the reference to the TRIPS Agreement and the Article 31 standard for
“adequate remuneration,” one possibility is that the U.S.-Uruguay BIT has
resolved ambiguity about the proper standard for compensation: look to Art 31.
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BIT defines the compensation standard of Article 6(1)(c) to be
“equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation took place.”149 Some would
argue that there is a difference between the standard of remuneration
required by Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the standard of
compensation for expropriation required under IIAs in investment
arbitration, with the former yielding a lower level of payment.150
Does the standard under Article 31, which refers to adequate
remuneration taking into account the “economic value of the
authorization,”151 exclude full consideration and compensation for
other elements that may comprise part of the patent-based investor’s
foreign investment? Does the requirement of “prompt” payment
under the U.S.-Uruguay BIT exclude the possibility of payment over
time (e.g., through royalties), which may be considered under Article
31?152 To the extent that there are real differences, should an
arbitration tribunal be concerned about the discontinuity between the
two standards?153 To take another example, is the non-discrimination
For BITs that do not have a provision such as Article 6(5) in the U.S.-Uruguay
BIT, however, the question would remain: compensation according to international
expropriation law standards or consistent with Article 31 to the extent there is any
difference?
149. U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 98, art. 6(2)(b).
150. See Taubman, supra note 14, at 951-55, 957 (examining the Article 31(h)
requirement of adequate remuneration by looking to the meaning of “adequate”
and explaining that the economic value of a compulsory license is not necessarily
equivalent to the full market value of a patent, and that the factual circumstances
behind the compulsory license will also affect its value). Ultimately, Taubman
concludes that “to be adequate, remuneration should reasonably compensate for
any conflict with normal exploitation and for any prejudice of legitimate interests.”
Id. at 957; see also Biadgleng, supra note 73, at 18 (explaining that adequate
remuneration under the TRIPS Agreement takes into account “the economic value
of the authorization for a compulsory license,” which is not the same as the market
value of the intellectual property right); Tsai-Yu Lin, supra note 7, at 163-64
(reasoning that, given the different remuneration standards, “the grant of
compulsory license could be interpreted as giving more patent protection than
under the TRIPS Agreement.”).
151. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31(h).
152. See Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements,
supra note 3, at 351 (believing the standard of “prompt” compensation intends
remuneration without unnecessary delay, though not necessarily requiring
immediate payment).
153. See Taubman, supra note 14, at 964 (reasoning that “if a level of
compensation is inconsistent with TRIPS, then the potential claim (if any) under
the law of expropriation should, ideally, match the degree to which the
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standard of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement,154 which would
apply to patent rights, any different from the reference to “nondiscriminatory” standard for expropriatory measures in Article 6(1)
of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT?155
Interestingly, there is overlap in the criteria established by Article
31 of the TRIPS Agreement, and Article 6 and Annex B of the U.S.Uruguay BIT, starting with the emphasis in Article 31(a) that, as to
each compulsory license, the “authorization of such use shall be
considered on its individual merits.”156 Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement contains criteria that, in toto, address all three factors set
forth in Annex B of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT.157 However, Article 31
provides more detailed guidance on the process and procedures by
which a compulsory license must be issued, potential limits on its
terms (e.g., scope, duration, amount of remuneration, and
predominantly for supply of the domestic market), as well as
procedures for challenge and review of the license.158 These more
detailed criteria are specifically adapted to the compulsory license
context and thus may prove to be instructive, or even compelling, to
an investment tribunal, at least as an initial frame of reference.
Unlike the U.S.-Uruguay BIT, however, most IIAs are silent about
the status of compulsory licenses as a regulatory measure affecting
investment. This silence adds emphasis to the choice and uncertainty
that an investor may face when, in response to a host state’s issuance
of a compulsory license, the investor considers whether to bring a
claim in investor-state arbitration or urge its own government to

compensation fell short of the TRIPS standard and not be substantially different,”
in order to “safeguard against forum shopping and erosion of the multilateral
system”).
154. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 27(1) (“[P]atents shall be available
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.”).
155. U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 98, art. 6(1)(b).
156. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31(a).
157. U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 98, Annex B, ¶ 4(a).
158. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31 (providing specific,
enumerated provisions to be respected when a Member uses the subject matter of a
patent without the right-holder’s authorization), with U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra
note 98, Annex B, ¶ 1 (using advisory language that, in expropriation situations,
the resolution is “intended to reflect customary international law”).
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initiate procedures under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism,
the DSU.

III. FORK IN THE ROAD—WHICH FORUM?
In this Part, I highlight the potential “fork in the road” posed by
the choice of forum, as well as the choice of law issues and possible
differences in remedies between investor-state arbitration and WTO
dispute settlement. As the discussion above makes clear, a
compulsory license-based investment claim brought by a foreign
investor against a host state under an investment treaty may implicate
several strands of public law that can be complimentary or
competing, integrated or overlapping: not only that law reflected in
the investment treaty, but also intellectual property law as established
through national law or the TRIPS Agreement.159 The discussion of
compulsory licenses above, and their potential to engender conflict
and a need for dispute settlement, brings this confluence of
competing legal regimes into stark focus. If a foreign investor
believes that a host state has improperly authorized a compulsory
license with respect to its patent rights, it may face a choice as to the
forum in which to seek to vindicate its rights. Because investment
agreements such as BITs stand side-by-side with the WTO
multilateral trading system, different regimes may afford protection
to the foreign investor in a state that is not only a member of the
WTO, but also has entered into an applicable IIA.160 The increasing

159. As one commentator puts it, “[t]he interconnections between investment
law and other areas of international law are manifold. Conflicts may arise between
an obligation of a state towards a foreign investor and its international obligation.”
Anne van Aaken, Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of International
Investment Protection 3 (Univ. St. Gallen L. Sch., Law and Econ. Res. Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
2008-1,
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097529; see also Taubman, supra note 14, at 970 (“The
law of expropriation, while an uneasy fit in strict legal terms with TRIPS law,
offers a source of comparable legal solutions that blend broad legal principles with
the pragmatic settling of disputes over actual property, including intangible
property . . . .”).
160. Ewing-Chow, supra note 96, at 549; see also Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of
Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relief for
Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 493-94 (2003) (introducing the
proposition that foreign investors might be able to use IIAs to challenge breached
WTO law and that government measures involved may constitute breaches of both
WTO law and the applicable IIA).
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possibility that these parallel trade and investment regimes may be
available to be invoked is underscored by the fact that a majority of
countries in the world are members of the WTO,161 and that by the
end of 2007, there were more than 2600 BITs, 2700 double taxation
agreements, and 250 free trade agreements between countries
containing investment provisions.162 The investor thus may have
options of pursuing investor-state arbitration, petitioning its own
government to commence WTO dispute settlement procedures, or
both.

A. CHOICE OF FORUM
As long as there is an applicable IIA in which a host state has
given its consent to arbitrate, nothing prevents a foreign investor
from bringing a claim against that host state in investor-state
arbitration. No permissions are required from the investor’s own
government or the host state.163 The patent-based investor need only
consult with its lawyers to assess its legal position and prepare a
claim alleging that the compulsory license violates the terms of the
relevant IIA. When seeking relief through the WTO system, by

161. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and
Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2010) (listing the 153 WTO Member States as of July 23, 2008).
162. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations,
and the Infrastructure Challenge, at xvii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2008 (Sept.
24, 2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf; see Karl P.
Sauvant, The Rise of International Investment, Investment Agreements and
Investment Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DISPUTES 3, 7-10 (Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson eds., 2008)
(calculating that by the end of 2006, there were 2,573 BITS, as well as 241
preferential trade and investment agreements that address not only investment
matters but also trade, intellectual property, competition, and government
procurement). The number of preferential trade and investment agreements almost
doubled between 2001 and 2006. Id. at 10, fig.1.6.
163. See, e.g., China-Germany 2003 BIT, supra note 78, art. 9 (setting forth,
without mention of government permission, the procedure for settling disputes).
Most IIAs stipulate that the parties should first seek an amicable settlement of the
dispute and impose a cooling-off period before a party may submit an arbitration
request. Id. art. 9(1)-(2). There may also be requirements that an investor first
exhaust certain local procedures, such as submit a claim to a national
administrative review before filing for investor-state arbitration. Id. at Protocol, ¶
6 (requiring German investors who wish to arbitrate to first submit their disputes to
certain Chinese administrative review procedures).
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contrast, the foreign investor must petition its home government to
initiate dispute settlement proceedings before the WTO.164 The host
state must be a member of the WTO, and the relevant allegations
must bear on that state’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.165
Should a country fail to fulfill its TRIPS Agreement obligations, the
WTO’s DSU166 provides a mechanism for the resolution of state-tostate disputes to promote compliance. Depending on how the
compulsory license was issued (e.g., the procedures followed in its
authorization) and its substantive terms, the investor can petition its
government that a violation of Article 31 (or other relevant
provisions) of the TRIPS Agreement has occurred.
Investors weighing the options of investor-state arbitration or
WTO dispute settlement procedures will face a complex set of
issues. Two basic questions of immediate relevance include, first,
whether a choice of one forum presents a true “fork in the road,”
such that it precludes pursuing relief through the other forum, and
second, whether investment arbitration or the WTO forum is to be
preferred. The answer to the second question may, of course, depend
upon the perspective from which one considers the question—that of
the investor or the host state. For purposes of this article, I focus on
the viewpoint of the investor.

164. See Martín Molinuevo, Can Foreign Investors in Services Benefit from
WTO Dispute Settlement?: Legal Standing and Remedies in WTO and
International Arbitration 12 (NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper No.
2006/17, 2006) (explaining that the legal standing in WTO disputes is an exclusive
right reserved for WTO Member States).
165. A number of IP-related trade disputes have been brought before the WTO.
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO
Panel Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions (Colum. L.
Sch., Ctr. for L. & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 181, 2001) (describing a
June 2000 WTO dispute resolution proceeding concerning a European Unioninitiated copyright dispute on behalf of an Irish performing rights organization, in
which the WTO panel held that the United States was violating its obligation under
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement to “confine limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the right holder” by “exempt[ing] a broad range of retail and restaurant
establishments from liability for the public performance of musical works by
means of communication of radio and television transmissions” under the 1998
Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
166. DSU, supra note 58.
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Addressing first the “fork in the road” issue, which could easily
arise in relation to a state’s issuance of a compulsory license, under
general international law there is currently no rule that would prevent
a parallel set of proceedings—that is, to prevent the foreign investor
from initiating investment arbitration against a host state, while the
investor’s home government concurrently exercises diplomatic
protection and commences WTO dispute settlement proceedings
against that same host state.167 The WTO agreements do not address
this potential for parallel proceedings or the possibility of a
“relitigation of a WTO-inconsistent measure in other forums,” and
indeed, such a phenomenon has already occurred.168 In a recent
dispute involving soft drinks with non-cane sugar sweeteners (e.g.,
high-fructose corn syrup) between the United States and Mexico (the
“Mexico-Soft Drinks” case), the WTO Appellate Body found that
Mexico’s tax on non-cane sugar soft drinks amounted to an indirect
tax on imported U.S. beet sugar and high-fructose corn syrup,169 in
violation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (“GATT”)
national treatment requirements.170 However, U.S. sweetener
companies also commenced proceedings against Mexico under North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) Article 1110,
“claiming that the Mexican tax was discriminatory and constituted
‘indirect expropriation.’”171 Both cases resulted in decisions in the
claimant’s favor.172
167. Verhoosel, supra note 160, at 495; Ewing-Chow, supra note 96, at 551.
168. Ewing-Chow, supra note 96, at 550-51.
169. Id. at 550-52 (citing Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on
Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS308/AB/R, AB-2005-1
(2006)).
170. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. III:2, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) (“The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not
be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any
kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”).
171. Ewing-Chow, supra note 96, at 551. Ewing-Chow makes the point that res
judicata will not apply because the parties in the two fora are different: in the
WTO, the dispute is between states, whereas in the arbitration, it is between the
investor and host state. Id. at 552.
172. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5
(Nov. 21, 2007)
(finding a violation of NAFTA’s national treatment and
performance requirement provisions, but not of its expropriation provision, and
awarding claimants damages of over $33 million against the Mexican
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Certain provisions in IIAs would seem to limit this parallel
litigation approach. For investor-state arbitrations taking place under
the ICSID Convention, Article 27(1) of that Convention provides in
relevant part that:
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or
bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one
of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have . . .
submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such
other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by . . . the
award rendered in such dispute.173
Similarly, NAFTA Article 2005(1) provides that disputes arising
under NAFTA or the GATT “may be settled in either forum at the
discretion of the complaining Party,” but Article 2005(6) specifies
the limitation that “[o]nce dispute settlement procedures have been
initiated . . . , the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the
other.”174
Despite these provisions, both of the Mexico-Soft Drinks
arbitration cases have already proceeded to a decision.175 Thus, it is
unclear how the scope of a “dispute” is to be defined for purposes of
ICSID Article 27(1) or NAFTA Article 2005. If the claims arise from
the same state measures but involve different parties (e.g., state-tostate vs. investor-state), implicate different legal grounds under the
relevant treaty provisions, and seek different remedies (e.g.,
withdrawal of a government measure vs. compensation for damages),
an argument can be made that the WTO and investment arbitration
cases concern different “disputes.”176 This issue is of obvious
government); Corn Products Int’l v. Mexico, Decision on Responsibility, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1 (Jan. 15, 2008) (determining Mexico violated NAFTA’s
national treatment provision, but postponing an award determination to future
proceedings).
173. ICSID Convention, supra note 81, art. 27 (emphasis added) (excluding
“informal diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a settlement of
the dispute”).
174. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 2005(1),
2005(6), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 694 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
175. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
176. Ewing-Chow, supra note 96, at 552. Ewing-Chow suggests that to prevent
potential liability in multiple forums for a single measure, “[states] should clarify
that, once the same economic interest or investment is being litigated under one of
the forums, litigation in the other forum is precluded even if the claimants and
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relevance to state authorizations of compulsory licenses, which can
involve different parties in the respective investor-state and WTO
forums, implicating not only expropriation standards under IIAs (and
possibly other core standards not addressed in this article), but also
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Differences in parties to
disputes, forum, and applicable law can also present different
remedies.

B. CHOOSING BETWEEN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION AND
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Turning the second question above—whether investor-state
arbitration or the WTO forum is to be preferred—the reasons why a
foreign investor may choose investor-state arbitration in the case of a
compulsory license include:
(i)

avoiding the need to persuade the investor’s home
government to initiate state-to-state dispute settlement
proceedings at the WTO;

(ii)

diminishing or avoiding political tensions that might
arise between the two states, which could complicate
the investor’s goals;

(iii)

a higher degree of control exercised by the foreign
investor over its claim;

(iv)

weighing the relative merits and likelihood of success
of the substantive claims that may be brought in either
forum;

(v)

similarly, weighing the remedies that may be
recovered in either forum; and

(vi)

considering eventual enforcement associated with a
resulting decision or award.177

legal claims are dissimilar.” Id. at 552-53.
177. One could also consider practical factors, such as time- and cost-efficiency,
to the extent they are different, between the two procedures.
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1. Investor Independence and Avoiding State Tensions
As noted above, investors choosing the WTO forum will be forced
to rely upon their government’s willingness to bring a claim, which
is not a foregone conclusion and may be subject to the vagaries of
other considerations in the relations between the two countries
concerned.178 The private investor will thus need considerable
political sway to induce its government to initiate the state-to-state
dispute.179 Closely related to this point is the potential advantage of
avoiding or reducing any tensions between governments that may
interfere with the investor’s goals. This has long been indicated as a
potential benefit to investment arbitration.180 The question must be
assessed in each specific case, however, because the vigorous
backing of the investor’s government may wield significant influence
with the host state, which could cause the host state to rethink a
compulsory license and avoid the need for the more involved
adjudicative procedures.181
2. Investor Control
Regarding the question of control, the investor in an investor-state
arbitration will have the greatest degree of control over its case
178. See House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Trade Hearing on the Outcome of the Summit of the Americas
and Prospects for Free Trade in the Hemisphere: Testimony of Daniel M. Price on
Behalf of the United States Council for International Business, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
313, 319 (2001) (advising that the private actor’s government will weigh “the
diplomatic pros and cons of bringing any particular claim”).
179. Ewing-Chow, supra note 96, at 554.
180. See, e.g., Stephen M. Schwebel, The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 265-66 (2009)
(discussing the substantive and procedural benefits of BITs, including the fact that
their near universal use of certain key provisions, such as fair and equitable
treatment, has made its way into customary international law and is thus binding
on every state).
181. See Ching-fu Lin, supra note 51, at 561-62 (discussing the European
Commission’s strong influence in a patent dispute between Philips Electronics of
the Netherlands and the government of Taiwan). In support of Philips’ position,
the European Commission issued a report finding that Article 76 of the Taiwan
Patent Act and the specific issuance of a compulsory license over Philips’ patents
pursuant to that Act were inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Id. at 562.
After consultations with the European Commission, Taiwanese authorities decided
not to appeal the decision of the Taipei High Administrative Court, which had
revoked the decision granting the compulsory license. Id.
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without any involvement from its own government. As discussed
above, the consent of the host state to arbitration allows the investor
to file a claim without first seeking permission from its own
government or waiver of sovereign immunity from the host state,182
and often without requiring the exhaustion of local remedies. The
investor can prepare and implement its own strategy for litigating
potential investment claims in connection with the compulsory
license based only on the investor’s assessment of the circumstances
and merits of the case. Even in WTO proceedings, however, private
parties have a greater role than merely filing amicus curiae
submissions.183 Often the private parties “stand side by side” with the
government in the pursuit of the WTO dispute and will have access
to the specific information and legal analysis needed by the
government officials.184 With a motivated and cooperative
government involved, the intergovernmental forum may provide an
important counterpoint, particularly if the investor’s goal is to have
the authorization of the compulsory license withdrawn or revised,
rather than simply seeking damages against the host state.

182. In this respect, Professor Thomas Wälde has emphasized just how
important to the investor the consent of the state to international arbitration is to
the underlying rights at stake:
It is the ability to access a tribunal outside the sway of the host State which is
the principal advantage of a modern investment treaty. This advantage is
much more significant than the applicability to the dispute of substantive
international law rules. The remedy trumps in terms of practical effectiveness
the definition of the right.
....
The effectiveness of substantive rights is everywhere – but nowhere more so
than in investment disputes – linked to the availability of an effective (i.e.
independent) enforcement procedure. This link is so close that the best way
to emasculate an investor right against a host State is to severe [sic] the link
between an international-law-based right and an international enforcement
procedure and to compel the investor to seek justice before domestic courts.
Right and procedural remedy are, in practical and effective terms, one.
Thomas Wälde, The “Umbrella” Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on
Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 183,
190, 194 (2005) (emphasis added).
183. Molinuevo, supra note 164, at 15.
184. See id. at 15-16 (explaining that the economic and legal details of a WTO
dispute are “the provinces of private business executives and individual legal
advisors”).
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3. Substantive Claims
The next factor, weighing the relative merits and likelihood of
success of substantive claims that may be brought in investor-state
arbitration or the WTO forum, obviously requires a careful review
not only of the relevant legal standards, but of the facts in a particular
dispute involving authorization of a compulsory license. This factor
is closely related to the issue of the remedies that may be sought,
which is discussed below. The analysis in Part II above considered a
detailed framework for evaluating a claim of indirect expropriation
under international investment law, as well as the criteria of Article
31 of the TRIPS Agreement in connection with the U.S.-Uruguay
BIT.185 I do not intend to repeat that analysis here. The question I do
want to address is whether, in the absence of an express reference to
the TRIPS Agreement (as in Article 6(5) of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT),
an investment tribunal can apply or make reference to TRIPS
Agreement standards.
Some commentators have suggested that,
[e]xcept in circumstances where the provisions of investment
agreements specifically refer to the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement, providing investors with the opportunity to
challenge governments on the violation of the TRIPS or any
other WTO agreement would be a radical departure from the
self-contained system of negotiation, implementation and
dispute settlement of the WTO.186
In line with this comment, and with particular relevance for
compulsory licenses, the argument continues that “the standards of
investment protection should not be applied to or derive substantive
interpretation from other unrelated domains of international law as it
may lead, in the case of IP rights of investment, to protection higher
than agreed under the specialised TRIPS Agreement.”187 Quite apart
from the sentiment of keeping these two systems of trade and
investment law separate and distinct, which I believe may prove
185. See discussion supra, Part II. In the WTO forum, a compulsory license
authorization would be evaluated under Article 31, which must be read in the
context of other potentially relevant provisions, such as Articles 7, 8, 40 and 42 of
the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 7, 8, 31, 40, 42.
186. Biadgleng, supra note 73, at 26.
187. Id. at 27.

GIBSON_SECOND_AUTHOR_CHECK (DO NOT DELETE)

410

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/14/2010 9:24 AM

[25:357

difficult in the case of a compulsory license, it is less than clear
whether importing TRIPS Agreement standards as applicable law
into an investment dispute would yield higher or lower standards of
protection for the investor.
One could easily imagine that the parties to an investment dispute
concerning a compulsory license might be tempted to invoke the
detailed criteria of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, leaving the
investment tribunal with a difficult and complex choice-of-law issue.
This is particularly the case where the host state and the investor’s
home state are both members of the WTO. Under one scenario, the
investor might assert that issuance of the compulsory license was
inconsistent with the detailed standards of Article 31, and rely on this
alleged violation as at least a partial predicate for a claim of indirect
expropriation (or violation of another core BIT standard, such as fair
and equitable treatment). On the other hand, under a different
scenario, if the investor claims that the compulsory license amounts
to an indirect expropriation under international investment law, the
host state, as respondent, may introduce Article 31 as a de facto
defense, maintaining that the state complied with the relevant TRIPS
Agreement criteria and therefore could not have forced an indirect
expropriation. The dispute could become focused on Article 31’s
terms and conditions. Now, we can ask the three questions that were
listed in the introduction:
(i)

can the government’s authorization of the compulsory
license be TRIPS Agreement compliant, yet violate
the expropriation term in the relevant IIA?

(ii)

can the government’s violation of the TRIPS
Agreement provide basis for an independent claim of
indirect expropriation under the IIA in investor-state
arbitration?

(iii)

alternatively, can TRIPS Agreement norms provide
interpretive background on minimum standards of
protection under international law to inform IIA
standards such as indirect expropriation?

The answer to these questions may rely first and foremost on the
language of the relevant IIA with respect to the applicable law for an
investment dispute. As discussed above, some BITs, such as the
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U.S.-Uruguay BIT, include references that directly involve the
TRIPS Agreement,188 while others make more general reference to
“international law,” “applicable rules of international law,” or
“customary international law.”189 Moreover, “[t]he ICSID
Convention, as one potential lex arbitri, . . . calls, i.a., for the
application of international law” as may be applicable (as a gap-filler
and for corrective effect) through Article 42, as discussed above.190
This might apply as a relevant basis for bringing in international law
in the case of a dispute under the China-Germany BIT discussed
above.191 While IIAs may vary in their particular wording, many
share a similarity in their lack of clarity about which type of
international law should be applied.192 Do these references to
international law leave room for application of non-investment
international law, such as the TRIPS Agreement, for a compulsory
license dispute?193 If not directly applicable, can the WTO standards
be considered by an investment tribunal as providing some measure
of interpretive context?194
188. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. A less direct, but
nevertheless broad reference that could encompass the TRIPS Agreement and
would be favorable to an investor, is found in the Canada-Argentina BIT.
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Nov. 5,
1991, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/argentina-e.pdf. Article XIII(1) provides in relevant part
that “[w]hen a matter is covered both by the provisions of this Agreement and any
other international agreement to which both Contracting Parties are bound, nothing
in this Agreement shall prevent an investor of one Contracting Party . . . from
benefitting from the most favourable regime.” Id. art XIII(1).
189. Many BITs contain clauses requiring fair and equitable treatment “in
accordance with principles of international law,” which provides a ground, apart
from indirect expropriation, for considering compulsory licenses and potential
reference to the TRIPS Agreement. See, e.g., id. art. II(4); U.S.-Uruguay BIT,
supra note 98, art. 5(1). Some BITs, such as the U.S.-Uruguay BIT, also make
reference to customary international law in the expropriation provision itself.
U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 98, Annex B, ¶ 1.
190. Van Aaken, supra note 159, at 2; see also supra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text (recognizing that the law of the host state and applicable rules
of international law will be the default law applied in the absence of a choice of
law provision).
191. See discussion, supra Part II.B.
192. Van Aaken, supra note 159, at 14.
193. Id. at 10.
194. See Verhoosel, supra note 160, at 503-04 (considering it appropriate to
allow the WTO Agreement to provide context for even those BITs concluded prior
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A number of commentators in this area have discussed the
NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions on investment, in particular Article
1105(1) mandating that “[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international
law, including fair and equitable treatment.”195 Regarding
“international law,” NAFTA tribunals have been required to decide
whether this phrase referred to all sources of international law,
including WTO disciplines, or implicitly referred only to customary
international law.196 In several NAFTA Chapter 11 cases, investors
challenged violations of certain regulatory measures, arguing that the
breach of any WTO obligations arising from those measures
necessarily resulted in treatment that was not “in accordance with
international law” under Article 1105(1).197 The NAFTA Free Trade
Commission, however, issued an interpretive note stating that this
phrase should be understood as a reference only to customary
international law, thereby excluding the possibility that investors
could invoke WTO obligations in support of their investment claims
under NAFTA Chapter 11.198 The Chapter 11 tribunal in Mondev v.
United States found that this interpretation “makes it clear that
Article 1105(1) refers to a standard existing under customary
international law, and not to standards established by other treaties of

to the Agreement’s completion).
195. NAFTA, supra note 174, art. 1105(1), 32 I.L.M. at 639 (emphasis added).
196. Van Aaken, supra note 159, at 14.
197. Verhoosel, supra note 160, at 500.
198. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, pt. 2 (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx. The relevant
part of the interpretive note reads:
Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be
afforded to investments of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the
NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there
has been a breach of Article 1105(1).
Id.
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the three NAFTA Parties.”199 Thus, at least within the “idiosyncrasies
of NAFTA,” an investment claim cannot be predicated on violations
of WTO law.200 However, this NAFTA analysis does not answer the
question with respect to the “international law” references in the
thousands of other IIAs, each of which have unique languages,
domestic contexts, and precedents.201 Particularly in light of the
Vienna Convention, discussed immediately below, it is possible that
an investor-state tribunal applying indirect expropriation standards
under a particular BIT may nonetheless find that reference to the
TRIPS Agreement provides useful guidance on relevant standards.
Even excluding direct application of WTO law, commentators
have suggested that the jurisprudence of the WTO may provide
interpretive context for investment disputes pursuant to Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”).202 This may be particularly appropriate to impart meaning
for an ambiguous investment standard such as “fair and equitable”
treatment.203 When interpreting a treaty, Article 31(3)(c) mandates
that “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context . . .
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.”204 When considering an investment dispute
involving a compulsory license and brought by an investor from a
WTO member country against a host state that is also a WTO
member, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT provides grounds for
considering the TRIPS Agreement and the detailed terms of its
Article 31 as a means of providing international standards of conduct
with respect to the host state’s (i) procedures for the issuance of the
compulsory license, and (ii) minimum terms and limits for such a

199. ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, Award (Oct. 11, 2002), ¶ 121.
200. Verhoosel, supra note 160, at 502-03.
201. Id. at 503. But see Van Aaken, supra note 159, at 15 (observing that some
investors argue that WTO law has attained customary international law status, such
that it can be applied to investment disputes).
202. Verhoosel, supra note 160, at 503.
203. Id. at 506.
204. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added). As to Article 31, it has been written that “[e]very
treaty provision must be read not only in its own context, but in the wider context
of general international law, whether conventional or customary.” Verhoosel,
supra note 160, at 503 (quoting IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES 139 (1984).
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license. These standards, as part of the international law applicable in
the relations between the two states, may provide relevant
background on the host state’s international obligations that would
be hard for an arbitration tribunal to ignore. Thus, in answer to the
third question above—whether TRIPS Agreement norms can provide
interpretive background on minimum standards under international
law for a compulsory license in relation to claims of indirect
expropriation—I would suggest that the answer is “yes,” particularly
if the parties in dispute are both from WTO member countries.
However, it has been observed that there is a fine line, if any,
between “applying” WTO law and relying on it for “interpreting” the
minimum standard of regulatory treatment under an IIA.205 One
exercise might easily lapse into the other, particularly for IIA core
standards such as fair and equitable treatment. For indirect
expropriation, however, while the TRIPS Agreement, through Article
31, may provide suggestive guidance (to a certain point) on the
detailed aspects of a compulsory license that can be considered, the
investment law analysis for an indirect expropriation—with the
examination discussed above including (i) regulatory taking based on
substantial deprivation; (ii) government representations or approval
of the patent rights associated with the investment; (iii) reasonable or
legitimate reliance by the patent-based investor; and (iv) the
character of the regulatory measure, including the purpose behind
it—remains sufficiently distinct such that the TRIPS Agreement
standards do not comprehensively answer the question of whether an
indirect expropriation has occurred. There is still “breathing space”
between the borders of the two regimes.
Thus, in answer to the second question above—whether an
investor-state tribunal’s finding that a host state’s compulsory license
violates the TRIPS Agreement can provide basis for an independent
claim of indirect expropriation—the answer would be “not
necessarily.” It would depend on the type of violation. For example,
a violation of Article 31(f) by not limiting the compulsory license to
use “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market” of the
host state,206 without more, may fall short of establishing grounds for
indirect expropriation. On the other hand, a failure to pay “adequate
205. Verhoosel, supra note 160, at 505-06.
206. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 31(f).
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remuneration” in accordance with Article 31(h)207 may serve as a
strong signal that there may be an indirect expropriation. Again, the
level of deprivation will have to be considered by the arbitral tribunal
to determine whether a taking had occurred, while balancing that
finding with an examination of the other relevant expropriation
factors.
Finally, in answer to the first question—whether a government’s
authorization of the compulsory license can be TRIPS Agreement
compliant, yet violate the expropriation term in an IIA—the answer
is also less than absolutely clear. As noted above, a host state, as the
respondent in a dispute, will have strong reasons to demonstrate that
its authorization of the compulsory license meets all of the criteria of
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. I believe this showing would be
given considerable weight by an arbitral tribunal, even if only as
“interpretive background.” By demonstrating elements such as the
non-exclusive nature of the license, its limited scope and duration,
limited use by any third-parties for domestic market purposes only,
and adequate remuneration, it is likely that the host state would
present a solid defense against the investor’s claims. However,
focusing again on the level of remuneration granted to the investor
under a compulsory license, as discussed above, the standards
between Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement and payment as
required for expropriation (e.g., fair market value of the investment
immediately before the expropriation took place) may be different. If
there is a substantial difference in degree between these two
standards of compensation, not just in theory, but in fact, one cannot
rule out the possibility of satisfying the elements for indirect
expropriation.208
Some commentators have raised concerns that this last scenario
would result in “TRIPS-Plus” protection for intellectual property.209

207. Id. art. 31(h).
208. It has even been suggested that “the potential claim (if any) under the law
of expropriation should, ideally, match the degree to which compensation fell short
of the TRIPS standard and not be substantially different.” Taubman, supra note
14, at 964. However, this approach, while recognizing a desire for coherence
between regulatory frameworks, would not necessarily have legal basis under the
IIA, unless the TRIPS Agreement standards are considered to be applicable or
persuasive international law.
209. See Van Aaken, supra note 159, at 25 (explaining that TRIPS allows states

GIBSON_SECOND_AUTHOR_CHECK (DO NOT DELETE)

416

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

6/14/2010 9:24 AM

[25:357

While the scenario could theoretically create a conflict between the
TRIPS Agreement and an IIA, in most cases this would be highly
unlikely, particularly given the degree of substantial deprivation
needed for a regulatory taking.210 A more likely scenario is that the
standards in the IIA may act so as a form of “discipline” for the host
state in its consideration of the remuneration to be paid to an
investor, as well as on other terms, when the state considers
authorization of a compulsory license.211
Thus, while Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement may provide
helpful interpretive background for an indirect expropriation
analysis, a violation of the TRIPS Agreement does not necessarily
give rise to indirect expropriation. At the same time, compliance with
the TRIPS Agreement does not necessarily yield immunity.
Importantly, to the extent that the TRIPS Agreement is considered
relevant as interpretive background, a violation of Article 31 may
provide grounds that can be considered in an analysis of fair and
equitable treatment under an IIA. In some respects, the reference to
Article 31 may weigh more heavily in relation to a claim of violation
of the fair and equitable treatment standard than in relation to
indirect expropriation.

to elect for greater protection of IPRs, and that BITs could be interpreted as
providing such an election because they typically command full, prompt
compensation for takings); Biadgleng, supra note 73, at 18-19 (hypothesizing that
the differences between TRIPS and BITS as to what constitutes adequate
remuneration could challenge the competence of arbitration tribunals dealing with
IPRs). The TRIPS Agreement is intended to provide international minimum
standards for the recognition, protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights and specifies that Members may, if they choose, “implement in their law
more extensive protection.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. 1(1).
210. See Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements,
supra note 3, at 350-51 (noting that, in certain circumstances, a compulsory license
might not diminish a patent’s value, namely where a) global demand increases as a
result of the compulsory license; b) royalties cover the loss of business to
competitors; or c) the compulsory license occupies an insignificant share of the
market).
211. See id. at 352 (“Given the gray area that overlapping protections create,
investor’s rights may be used to dissuade governments from using compulsory
licenses.”).
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4. Remedies and Enforcement
The alternatives of investor-state arbitration or WTO dispute
settlement provide two distinct methods for remedies in disputes
involving compulsory licenses.212 Remedies available through the
WTO state-to-state procedures would focus on the removal of the
compulsory license, or bringing it into compliance with TRIPS
Agreement standards,213 while investor-state tribunals would look to
award compensation for damages in the case of an indirect
expropriation or other violation of the IIA.214 The WTO remedy is

212. Molinuevo, supra note 164, at 19-20.
213. The DSU, Article 3.7, provides in relevant part that:
The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution
to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and
consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the
absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute
settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of
the covered agreements. The provision of compensation should be resorted to
only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a
temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is
inconsistent with a covered agreement.
DSU, supra note 58, art. 3.7 (emphasis added). Article 19.1 provides in relevant
part that: “Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is
inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.” Id. art. 19(1)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Withdrawal or compliance may be more
attractive to a long-term investor than damages because they allow for a continued
competitive environment in the host state. Ewing-Chow, supra note 96, at 555 &
n.36. It is always possible, though unlikely, that the parties may agree to arbitrated
compensation. Taubman, supra note 14, at 969. Article 22.1 of the DSU provides
in relevant part:
Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are
temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and
rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. However,
neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations
is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure
into conformity with the covered agreements. Compensation is voluntary and,
if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.
DSU, supra note 58, art. 22.1 (emphasis added).
214. See Molinuevo, supra note 164, at 20 (explaining that investor-state
procedures focus on remedying the investor’s financial harm); see also BISHOP ET
AL., supra note 5, at 1253 (quoting CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, Section 6: Article 54
[Enforcement], in THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1098, 1124-26
(2001)) (“The obligation to enforce extends only to pecuniary obligations imposed
by the award . . . . [and not] to other forms of specific performance or an injunction
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“outright prospective” in contrast with damages compensation from
investor-state disputes.215 For a foreign investor intending to continue
its commercial operations in the host state, removal of the
compulsory license may be a preferable remedy to an award of
compensation.216 However, if the WTO procedure merely ensures
TRIPS Agreement compliance, and this does not result in a
compulsory license with terms agreeable to the investor, then
damages through investment arbitration may provide a more
advantageous alternative, particularly if the damages to the
investment are considered to cover the entire dimensions of the
investment, not just the IPRs subject to the compulsory license.
Compensation for damages may be particularly attractive if the
compulsory license has severely damaged the foreign investor’s
position such that continuation of commercial activities becomes
unlikely in the host state. Thus, there are potential advantages and
disadvantages to each forum and approach to potential remedies.
Finally, the investor in a dispute concerning a compulsory license
will have to consider the eventual enforcement associated with a
WTO decision or investment arbitration award. Both systems
provide possibilities for enforcement (or retaliatory measures in the
case of a WTO Member State) against a non-complying state. An
award rendered under the ICSID Convention is enforceable in
accordance with Article 54, which provides that “[e]ach Contracting
State shall recognize an award . . . as binding and enforce the
pecuniary obligations . . . within its territory as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State.”217 There is no possibility of appeal,
and the ICSID system provides no grounds for challenging an
investor-state award in a court, as is possible under the New York

to desist from a certain course of action.”)); Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended
Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DISPUTES, supra note 162, at 241, 256 (observing that there is “the emerging
confirmation of a presumption against the availability of specific performance or
restitution in kind as a remedy against States”).
215. Molinuevo, supra note 164, at 23. Molinuevo further explains that “[t]he
obligation to eliminate the inconsistent measures does not arise until the period of
time given to the respondent to implement the recommendations and rulings . . .
has elapsed.” Id.
216. Id. at 24; Ewing-Chow, supra note 96, at 555.
217. ICSID Convention, supra note 81, art. 54.
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Convention.218 This approach will allow the investor to enforce an
award in any country where the host state may hold funds (e.g.,
funds in bank accounts). Alternatively, in order to enforce the award,
the investor might be required to avail itself of the domestic courts of
the host state against whom such enforcement is sought, which is the
very jurisdiction the investor originally hoped to circumvent in
submitting the dispute to investment arbitration.219 In this case, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity may also be used to impede
execution of the award.220 Under the WTO system, there are several
possibilities for enforcement, including diplomatic pressure to
withdraw the compulsory license or bring it into compliance,
obtention of compensation (which is voluntary), or suspension of
trade concessions as a form of retaliation.221 These measures may
bring the investor the relief it desires, but the process may be lengthy
and is not guaranteed to achieve a tailored outcome for the particular
investor, even if some form of enforcement takes place.222

CONCLUSION
Compulsory licenses bear an inherently contentious character.
This government authorized license often presents a clash between
significant opposing interests—on one side, the legitimate
expectations of patent-based foreign investors founded on the IIA
and an international patent regime that, for well-established and
widely accepted reasons, provides relatively strong and permanent
protection during the patent term, and on the other side, the strength
of public needs in exceptional cases, such as a public health crisis.

218. See U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards [New York Convention] art. V, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38
(setting forth the conditions under which recognition and enforcement of an award
may be refused).
219. Molinuevo, supra note 164, at 22-23.
220. See ICSID Convention, supra note 81, art. 55 (clarifying that Article 54 of
the ICSID Convention does not affect the execution of immunity laws in
Contracting States).
221. DSU, supra note 58, art. 22.
222. See Molinuevo, supra note 164, at 24-25 (noting that, as of 2006, no WTO
case had resulted in the voluntary compensation option, with parties instead
resorting to retaliatory suspension of concessions). The procedures established by
the DSU for a State to suspend concessions may have an unforeseen or even
negative impact on investors in services. Id. at 25-26.
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The circumstances that may be commonly associated with the
issuance of a compulsory license, in which an investor’s existing IP
rights and investment position are severely impacted, provide the
seeds for a dispute and strong incentive for the investor to seek
recourse through available means of dispute settlement.
In this context, the compulsory license in relation to IP-based
investments and potential claims of indirect expropriation illustrates
two levels of complexity for international investment law and related
disputes. First, the tension between investors’ rights (guaranteed
through the IIA and the patent regime) and government action in the
area of compulsory licensing is but a specialized example of a
broader recurrent public policy issue in international investment law.
As Karl Sauvant puts it, the broader question is “what constitutes the
appropriate balance between the rights and responsibilities of
investors and those of governments.”223 The investor is entitled to
have its legitimate expectations with regard to the operation and
return on its investment respected by the host state. However, the
host state should be able to pursue lawful regulatory goals without
risk of “regulatory chill.”224 The investment dispute context for a
compulsory license brings these countervailing concerns to a head as
arbitration tribunals must balance the rights and responsibilities of
investors and those of governments, within the appropriate legal
frameworks. The resulting arbitral award may have implications not

223. Karl P. Sauvant, Introduction, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008 - 2009 xxiv (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009)
[hereinafter Sauvant, Introduction]; see also Peter Muchlinski, Trends in
International Investment Agreement: Balancing Investor Rights and the Right to
Regulate. The Issue of National Security, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008 – 2009, supra at 35 (referring to the emerging
concern of reconciling “the relationship between investor rights and regulatory
discretion”); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way?: Alternative Methods of
Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138, 141
(2007) (suspecting that if a compulsory license is declared illegal under the
applicable BIT, the award of damages may influence the host government to
amend its compulsory license measures in order to avoid similar future claims).
224. Muchlinski, supra note 223, at 39-40; see also INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, supra note 60, at 75 (“[P]arts of civil society in some
countries have expressed fears that the prospect of investor-State arbitration arising
out of alleged regulatory takings could result in a ‘regulatory chill’ on the ground
that concern about liability exposure might lead host countries to abstain from the
necessary regulation.”).
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only for the investor, but for the ability of host states to take
specialized regulatory measures.
Specifically with regard to compulsory licenses, these issues
coalesce around questions of how much leeway governments should
have to take actions that may interfere with IPRs and IP-based
investments, whether these actions contravene the standards of
protection established for foreign investors under national patent
laws and IIAs, and whether such measures are otherwise defensible
as consistent with non-investment law treaty provisions, such as
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. As the discussion above
demonstrates, in the case of indirect expropriation, arbitral tribunals
may be required to draw distinctions in fact-intensive proceedings
between lawful, yet specialized, regulatory powers and a “regulatory
taking” that amounts to an indirect expropriation.225
The possible reference to the WTO TRIPS Agreement
demonstrates the second level of complexity: the compulsory license
provides a case in point to show the intricate interplay between two
different treaty-based regimes. A compulsory license-based claim for
indirect expropriation against a host state under an IIA may implicate
several strands of public law that can be complimentary or
competing, integrated or overlapping. International investment law,
as channeled through the investment treaty, confronts intellectual
property law as established through national law or the TRIPS
Agreement. The compulsory license brings this confluence of
competing legal regimes into stark focus. If a foreign investor
believes that a host state has improperly authorized a compulsory
license with respect to its patent-based investment, it may face not
only a choice of forum in which to vindicate its rights, but also
complex choice of law issues in making out a claim of indirect
expropriation. Because investment agreements such as BITs stand
side-by-side with the WTO multilateral trading system, these
different regimes may afford different levels of protection and
different remedies to the foreign investor in a dispute where the
investor’s home state and the host state are both members of the
WTO, or where the IIA itself makes reference to the TRIPS
Agreement.
225. See Muchlinski, supra note 223, at 43 (explaining that several recent IIAs
have attempted to clarify this difference)
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The issuance of a compulsory license and its potential impact on a
foreign investment presents a good case study to demonstrate, as
Sauvant recently wrote, that “the international investment law and
policy regime is evolving, and is likely to continue to do so in the
future.”226 For all these potentially wide-ranging concerns, however,
the private investor’s chief aim regarding its IP-based investment
may be much more narrowly focused—to utilize a new, direct means
available through investor-state arbitration for seeking international
enforcement of its intellectual property rights.

226. Sauvant, Introduction, supra note 223, at xxvi.

